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This thesis is an analysis of African Nationalism in
Zimbabwe, from 1920 to 1965. This period is significant to the
overall study of African Nationalism in Zimbabwe due to the
fact that it marks the beginning of organized mass African pro¬
test against a European government, and the end of non-violent
tactics in favor of armed struggle for the obtainment of Af¬
rican Nationalism.
The First Chapter is a review of literature on African
Nationalism in Zimbabwe. The Second Chapter is an overview of
the establishment of settler rule and early forms of African
resistance. Chapter Three examines African political parties
and the reasons for their formation. The next Chapter dis¬
cusses the shortcomings of African Nationalism due to govern¬
ment suppression of organized African mass protest and hence
the frustration of African Nationalist leaders. The conclusion
discusses the agencies of change used by African Nationalists
and suggests that they were not sufficient for the achievement
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That there has been quite a substantial amount of infor¬
mation generated on African Nationalism in Rhodesia is evi¬
denced by the numerous books and articles that have appeared
in the past and continue to do so every year. However, most
of this literature discusses African Nationalism under the
assumption that the nationalist movements represented the will
of the people. Very little has been written about the basic
interests and aspirations of the nationalist leaders and the
masses so as to discern their compatability and hence the
effect of the Nationalist leaders in either retarding or stim¬
ulating a more comprehensive political program and machinery
to reach the desired and common goals.
This study aims at disclosing the basic conditions that
are necessary for any movement whose objective is national
liberation: these conditions being analogous relations between
the nationalist leaders and the masses; which is the determinant
of the desired line of action. In Rhodesia as in other parts
of the world the history of its political and economic develop¬
ment, especially under capitalism', is bound to bring about
social changes. It is these changes which culminate in certain
socio-economic patterns which when analyzed could bring the
nationalists closer to the truth about the needs of the masses
as distinct from.their own. The idea is to direct the movement
1
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according to the will and needs of the masses but if the will
of the masses is opposed to the interest of the leaders then
there could develop problems on the line of action. Any study
of African Nationalism in Rodesia should not be confined to the
particular area of the attempt by African organizations and
political parties to voice their opinions wherever the interests
of the African masses were in question but should also include
the reasons why and how the masses were involved in the conflict
between Africans and the settler community.
African Nationalism in Rhodesia basically is the attempt
by Africans, individually and through organizations and poli¬
tical parties to break the political power-of the entrenched
white settlers. Power they have had since the early part of
the 20th Century. The development of nationalism in Rhodesia
was centered around seeking concessions, legal rights, equality
and political power from these settlers. To understand this
struggle between the oppressed Blacks and the white oppressor
and exploiter, one needs to understand the origin and develop¬
ment of this conflict. Although a considerable variety of
literature on the development of this conflict has appeared in
the past, certain literary works pertaining to this study will
suffice as representative of the whole. The issue, therefore,
involves the scope and method and the overall approach and
framework which form the basis for most of the discussions on
African nationalism found in the various books that will be
reviewed in this section.
There are those who contend that the history or approach
to a discussion on African nationalism should follow what they
3
term the development of a historical necessity; that the his¬
tory of Rhodesia is that of white penetration and its Christian
civilizing mission.^ Some tend to concentrate their discus¬
sions on the effects of settler penetration into Rhodesia on
the African majority and also - the African's response to this
2
imposed rule. The rest use these two approaches to discern
the injustices that have been imposed on the majority by the
white minority and to expound on the reasons why Africans have
been involved in a relentless struggle against oppression and
3
exploitation.
Although he does not discuss nationalism in particular
4
Colin Ley's discussion, which concentrates, on European poli¬
tics, serves as an adequate description of what could be con¬
sidered the roots of conflict between Africans and the minority
settler community. Leys explains that the intentions of the
settlers were determined by what they believed to be a vast
amount of gold in this region. The first step, therefore,
would necessitate the entrenchment of white power and dominance
geared towards white advancement without any concern for any of
the benefits directly affecting the African population as a
whole. This step guaranteed a tight political structure of a
^W. A. Wills and L. T. Collingridge, The Downfall of
Lobengula (Bulawayo: Books of Bulawayo, 1971) .
2
Patrick Hone, Southern Rhodesia (New York: Negro Uni¬
versity Press, 1966).
3
Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (New York: Trans-
Atlantic Arts, 1966).
4 . .
Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).
4
European community settled among a much larger population of
Africans. Even with an expanding economy. Leys points out,
'the distribution of the increased national income is so un¬
even, with over ninety two percent of the population receiving
only about a quarter of it'.
Infact the legal apparatus itself was not an instrument
of expansion but of defense, designed to consolidate a
social and economic system which had been founded on a
gross overestimate of the country's wealth.5
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, operating under
the so-called 'spirit of partnership' marked the highest period
of an economic change that had begun immediately after the
Second World War. However, this economic change was not fol¬
lowed by a similar change in the political structure and the
social conditions of the majority of the African population.
Leys states: . ,
As a rule, at home, at school, in hotels and restau¬
rants, in clubs, on holidays, in trains and buses,
in prison, in hospitals and churches the Europeans
meet only each other. They encounter Africans only
as domestic servants.6
and adds:
The racial equality thus established in principle does
not yet mean that the Africans everywhere hold jobs on
a par with Europeans working on the same mines, but it
is the companies' intentions (and in their interest)
that this should eventually happen.7
0
On this issue James Barber maintains that this new policy
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 12.
"^Ibid. , p. 113 .
O
James Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 7.
5
meant that in the long run races should not be divided; that
Africans, like Europeans must share the rights, privileges and
obligations of full citizenship. However, opposition to even
this inconsiderable equality in principle increased; the Segre
gation Society formed in 1954 to stop amendment to the Land
Apportionment Act to allow multi-racial clubs and hostels to
be located in the European area, etc., was a result.
Leys concludes that the whole white apparatus and its
people were determined by political ideas (Western Christian
civilization) that had developed during the earlier part of
settler colonialism. The fundamental objective, one settler
would state later bn, was to establish in southern Africa
strong and powerful states based on "British conditions with
the closest possible ties with Britain." In Sinoa a small
town in Rhodesia, Welensky, then Prime Minister of the Feder¬
ation, amplified this belief saying that 'as a people whether
Black or white they were British and are determined that this
9
will not change'. To show why the African should be appreci¬
ative of this newly acquired status which in this case was a
justification of African oppression and exploitation the
settler leaders believed that:
The African, has never developed for himself a high
civilization of his own, as have other people of the
world who were presumably created at the same time.
He has remained in his primitive state until invaded
by the Whiteman's civilization, which he is now eager
to imitate.
9
C. Leys, op. cit., p. 247.
^^James Barber, op. cit., p. 259.
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That this whole political idea and economic interests
were behind the establishment of an oppressive apparatus to
implement white racist and segregatory laws and that this pro¬
cess set the stage for African nationalist struggles against the
white racist regime is not hard. to. discern at this point.
Terrence Ranger has attempted to use the African approach to
this conflict by narrating the reaction of the Africans in
Southern Rhodesia to the entrenchment and encroachment of white
power.The increasing and almost successful resistance to
white settler rule in the latter part of the nineteenth century
was offset by the use of the most cruel and barbaric military
means of coercion and suppression against the African people.
The suppression of the uprisings was slow and piecemeal
and very destructive; strongholds had been blasted with
dynamite; crops had been systematically destroyed.12
This brutal force to establish white power changed the African's
way of resistance to what Ranger calls the 'politics of pro-
13
test'. Inspite of this attempt to make the African voice
heard, the white government refused to improve the conditions
of the majority of the African people. After two decades of
the 'politics of protest' African leaders of certain organiza¬
tions decided to embark on the 'politics of participation'
marking a trend, according to Ranger, in the development of
^^Terence 0. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1897:
A Study in African-Resistance, (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), p. 347.
^^Ibid., p. 348.
13
T. 0. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 65-87.
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African nationalism that survives even though there is clear
evidence to the effect that tribulation within the African
population, whose elimination is the very essence of the na¬
tionalist struggle, is the enfolding of the settler's desire
to restrain (forcefully if necessaty) the African from any
effectual political participation. After the military strug¬
gles of the late part of the nineteenth century, African re¬
sistance has been marked by stages of change, in its historici
development, such as from 'political protest' to political
participation and then the demand for political power charac¬
terized by nationalist activities between 1955-1965. This
point Ranger develops through his discussion of the religious
movements whose driving force was the mystification of reality
the African associations whose main interest was to obtain pr;
vileges and whatever crumbs the settlers were willing to throv
at them, and the Unions which in spite of the fact that they
did not have the formal trade union structures (organization
and proletarian objective etc.) managed to get concessions in
14 15
various labor protests and strikes. These complexities
are characteristic of African resistance even up to current
16
times. However, as Gibson states, (Gibson's book is dis-
^^T. O. Ranger, op. cit., pp. 138-193.
l^For a further discussion on the vicissitudes of African
nationalism a look at T. M. Franks, Race and Nationalism, The
Struggles for Power in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1960).
lORichard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 153.
8
cussed at length later in this study):
Despite these vicissitudes, the Industrial and Com¬
mercial Worker Union (ICU) in one form or another
survived in Rhodesia until the Second World War.
Its tradition of militant working class protest pro¬
vides a major element of militancy in the Zimbabwe
national movement's heritage.17
The conclusion that one can come fo from Ranger's book is that
African resistance to settler colonialism has not ceased at
any given time but has taken different'forms in the development
of African society, thus culminating in the formation of Africa
nationalist organizations and parties in the latter part of
18
1950. That Africans knew that settler colonialism was the
cause of conflict is evident in their statements and activities
but that they believed that they could alleviate this problem
is questionable; taking into consideration their more external
approach to this problem.
John Day analytically describes African nationalism in
Rhodesia placing more emphasis on the nationalists' activities
abroad. Because historical developments led to a conflict bet¬
ween Blacks and whites, nationalism was bound to emerge from
this development, but Day believes that the most significant
aspect of African nationalism began on September 12, 1957, with
the merger of the City Youth League and the re-activated
19
African National Congress. The African nationalists placed
more emphasis on gaining support from other African as well as
^"^Ibid., p. 154.
^®T. 0. Ranger, op. cit., p. 234.
19
N. Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (New York: Trans-
Atlantic Arts, 1966), p. 190.
9
European countries even when they were constantly rebuffed by
some, especially Britain whose Undersecretary of State for
Commonwealth "Relations once told Joshua Nkomo that "Africans
could not be given control in Southern Rodesia because the
complex industrial organization there must not be placed in
20
inexperienced hands!!' Leonard Kapungu (whose book is dis¬
cussed later in this study) believes that it would be unlikely
that Africans could obtain independence through Britain and
through passive resistance. The nationalists had visited
various East European countries, however, there were no indi¬
cations to the effect that they were attempting to embark on
the socialist direction. Unclear as this relationship seems
to be. Day assumes that Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)
has always been pro-Soviet Union and Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) pro-Chinese. As a conclusion to the overall de¬
velopment of African nationalism in Rhodesia Day states:
Throughout its history the modern African nationalist
movement has had a neglegible chance of influencing
government policy, especially on fundamental consti¬
tutional questions.21
Therefore:
The Southern Rhodesia nationalist movement has been
inevitably destined to frustration, every avenue
open to them was likely to prove a cul-de-sac.22
20
Leonard Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom
(New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p. 42.
21
John Day, International Nationalism (London: Oxford




The closure of all avenues, therefore, necessitated a radical
change in African politics, a change African nationalists were
not prepared to face in 1957-1965.
Leonard Kapungu develops his discussion from the postu¬
lation that Africans were not only struggling against a system
tailor made to entrench white domination but also the racist
attitudes of whites whose lack of education and skill had
23
rendered them useless in their own countries of birth.
Africans were frustrated by institutionalized racism and segre-
gatory laws examplified by the Land Apportionment Act, the Land
Husbandry Act and the Industrial Concill'iation Act coupled with
minimal spending"on African education and a lack of African
political representation. Liberalism, a concept pushed to the
extreme during the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was
'nothing but paternalism, and according to Kapungu this was a
product of inferiority-superiority relationships between Africar
and Europeans.
The 1961 coristitution was accepted (by whites) not be¬
cause white Rhodesia was becoming more liberal, as
Whitehead thought, but because they were afraid of
British intervention on the African's behalf.
African rejection of Whitehead's tokenism was consequential to
the introduction of the Law and Order Maintenance Act under-
25
which could be used brutal force, arrests, shootings and
detention to frustrate the African nationalist movement.
23L. Kapungu, op. cit., p. 42.
^"^Ibid. , pp. 45-47.
25 shamuyarira, op. cit., p. 190.
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Kapungu points out that this was the moment when Africans
needed revolutionary tactics and strategies to fight force
with force and that this step would have necessitated trust
and coordination between the leaders and the people so as to
put an end to unapproachable leadership.
An analysis of the internal Rhodesian situation in 1965
showed that armed struggle and guerrilla warfare would neces¬
sarily be the next step towards African independence. Richard
Gibson's study of African nationalists movements clarifies the
importance of developing well organized liberation movements
') ft
as a basis for the struggle for national liberation. The
study reveals numerous problems that need to be overcome during
the development of liberation organizations from political
parties to national liberation movements. Although they are
divided on various issues concerning African liberation,
Africans seem united in that they do not want minority rule in
Rhodesia which they view 'naturally as treachery and aggresion!
Gibson's discussion of the African liberation movements is de¬
tailed and much of it is beyond the scope of this study.
A review of his description of nationalist parties how¬
ever will throw some light on what caused this development.
That Africans had resorted to armed struggle was, according
to Gibson, a resultant of government action and British in¬
action. It was Britain that 'took the line that only the
British government had the right to do anything about Southern
^^ibson, op. cit., p. 26.
12
Rhodesia and it had chosen not to do so'. This position was
taken in response to growing pressure from African members of
the United Nations Organization for Britain to use force if
necessary to briiig’ the whites back to their right senses.
Frustration resulted in a split within the African movement
but Gibson concludes that Knomo was the target of the new move
ment's charges, especially his numerous travels abroad, con¬
sidered by ZANU to be 'action away from hot action at home'.
This view seems to be supported by Shamuyarira who adds that
the split caused quite a bit of animosity among not only the
leaders but the people also. According to Gibson:
Both ZANU and ZAPU enjoyed exactly one year of legal
existence under the settler regime, during which
militants of the two organizations probably struck
more blows at each other than at the white regime.^'
And the attempt to reconciliate them failed because:
...enmities had become bitter, while ideological
or opportunistic alliances also intervened.^8
The reasons for the split are stated in detail by Nathan
Shamuyarira and Ndabaningi Sithole whose books will be dis-
29
cussed in the following pages, Shamuyarira and Sithole's
books will be reviewed on a more thorough basis than has been
done so far, the reason being that both present information
at least from the inside of the movement since they were in¬




29 Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (Oxford: Univer¬
sity Press, 1966), p. 35.
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Sithole and Shamuyarira are in agreement on the causes
of the split which they say occurred because the majority of
the executive in ZAPU were beginning to question Nkomo's lead¬
ership. This challenge to Nkomo's leadership stems from what
the two nationalists considered, his inability to act on the
government's stringent laws which had, among other things,
made it hard for the 'mass movement to publish a newspaper,
organize a big meeting or demonstration, or do anything to show
effective opposition to the government! Africans had come to
the conclusion that political parties were not effective and
that "underground" was the only way. Thus- most people were
very critical of Nkomo's hesitation to return to Southern
Rhodesia following the banning of ZAPU, because they wanted a
"policy of confrontation": they wanted a new political party
to be formed; they were disappointed at his lack of decisive¬
ness as a leader; and they felt that "run away politics" were
not going to emancipate Zimbabwe. Sithole complements
Shamuyarira's views by adding that after the conferences of the
Heads of African States held in Addis Ababa in April 1963:
...we returned to Dar es Salaam bitterly divided
among ourselves. At last Mr. Joshua Nkomo, our
President, was forced to return home to be with our
followers, but the whole thing had left a sour taste
in our mouths. In June, we split into two...the Sit¬
hole group and the Nkomo group. The people at home
were also divided accordingly.30
Any attempts at reconciliation failed because Sithole and:




tained that there had never been any split, all
people were united behind him. He continually
invited ZANU leaders to 'return to the people'
where he alleged, he was. It was unity on his
terms or nothing.31
However, what lead to this split’ is described well by
Shamuyarira in his book which looks at African nationalism
from a position he had as editor of the African Daily News.
African nationalism began in earnest with the City Youth League
(CYL) in 1955 and later on increased its thrust with the forma¬
tion of the ANC. According to Shamuyarira Africans originally
had been pushed into thinking that Europeans had genuine sym¬
pathy for their appeals hence the decisions by most nationalist
to work within multi-racial associations. One such believer
was Edson Sithole who;
After I had briefly described the aims and objects
of the Inter-Racial Association he cut ini2
long as it is multi-racial, I will join'.
By 1956, most Africans were working within Prime Minister Todds
ruling party because a "stage had been reached when Africans had
begun to regard the government as their own'. Inspite of this,
Shamuyarira adds that some Africans could not be deceived be¬
cause even though they enjoyed certain privileges sooner or
later they had to return to the poverty of the masses, so they
were encouraged to form the CYL which grew as common-man's
movement; it rose from the people rather than starting with
the recognized leaders of former times! With the formation
33
Shamuyarira, op. cit., p. 191.
^^Ibid., p. 19.
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of CYL, the new leaders denounced all other organizations
especially Mzi’ngeli' s ICU. which, they accused of opposing the
CYL 'in leading Southern Rhodesia into the modern Africa of
self-determination, self rule and independence'. Before com¬
bining with the ANC the CYL had been successful in organizing
a boycott of the city buses in Salisbury which ended with the
company that owned these buses lowering the fares.
The ANC, whose leader Nkomo was chosen as president be¬
cause he was an older and less militant m^n than Chikerema,
the former leader ..of the CYL, penetrated the rural areas where
they started 'a chain of events which led to a modification
of the powers of the Native Affairs Department' notorious for
the mistreatment of Africans and rejection of their legitimate
demands. Hence Shamuyarira infers:
The ANC should be remembered for its contribution
to the development of the African political move¬
ment's professionalism, non-racialism. Humanism
and Pan-Africanism.33
The formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP), after
ANC was banned, 'produced the biggest thrust in African na¬
tionalist thinking because it began to attract educated
Africans like Chitepo, Parirenyatwa, Psyarayi, Mugabe, etc.
thus the motto of the new party was:
We are no longer asking Europeans to rule us
well. We now want to rule ourselves.34
However, Whitehead used the violence that erupted in the country
as an excuse to ban the NDP but a new party, ZAPU, was formed
33■^•^Ibid. , P-' 49.
34^..,Ibid., P- 59.
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under the same leadership. The African nationalist movement
had taken a turn, during the two former movements, from that
of docility to that of militancy and radicalism. The reasons
for this change, Shamuyarira concludes, stem from the fact
that the government'had frustrated the movements by not only
refusing to give in to some of the nationalist demands but
also by arresting, intimidating and detaining Africans without
trial.
It is not surprising, therefore that a main feature
of ZAPU's short life was a conviction among Africans
that their struggle would have to involve bloodshed
and violence.35
But again:
It had been agreed before the banning of. ZAPU that
although mass support was assured, the best tactical
weapon was not to try to mobilize the masses but to
concentrate on a small body of saboteurs.36
For ZAPU, the land issue became the main point of focus since
it could be the rallying point for a united African people.
The reason being that:
No act has brought more ill will for the govern¬
ment among Africans than the Native Land Husbandry
Act. As I have shown already, the popularity of
the ANC and its successor NDP, was mainly based on
combined furhl" and urban opposition to this act.^^
This unity then, necessitated a change from what Sithole calls
'reform politics to the path of take over politics'.





he published what he called a 'historic document' drawn up
15 members of ZANU Central Committee in which he stated that:
Every man must have axes, bows and arrows, and
other instruments ready to oppose physical uni¬
lateral independence and Act as soon as unilateral
independence is declared.
All Africans must withdraw their children from
school as soon as illegal independence is declared.
The President of ZANU will declare a State of Emer¬
gency -in the party and country when the times comes.
That will be the time to act and to do whatever you
are ordered to do.
Zimbabwe is near--now you should lay down your lives,
honor-and fortunes to make it a reality. LONG LIVE
ZANU, LONG LIVE ZIMBABWE.38
This document developed out of a feeling in Sithole; a feelir
he calls nationalism. African nationalism is a 'political
feeling manifesting itself against European rule infavor of
African rule'. Nationalism, a God sent force according to
Sithole, destroyed the myth of white supremacy; a philosophy
which assumes that 'the white man, in relation to the Africar
holds the highest place in government or power in the econom^i
and in society in general''. Sithole proceeds to be apologetic
in saying that 'in fairness to the white people, it is not
white people who tend to look at other people in this fashior
it is a universal trait among all conquerors'. However, in
Rhodesia this nationalist desire for African rule springs frc
his immediate situation and is certainly stimulated by what
he has learnt of the triumphs of African nationalism else¬
where. But, nationalism involves the 'tremendous psychologic
3 8
Sithole, op. cit., p. 40.
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process of internal emancipation which must precede that of
political liberation. On the whole, Sithole's discussion is
not on African nationalism in Zimbabwe specifically, in spite
39
of this, certain concepts that he raises in his book need
a little discussion so as to bring to light some events and
thought that could have influenced his views and decisions
during the development of African nationalist, politics. The
post-World War II period was, according to Sithole, permeated
by the United Nations' 'sterling work in transfer of capital
and skills from developed to developing countries in order to
bridge the North-South gap'. In addition to this postulation
he states that even though colonialism affected Africans in
different ways it had played a positive role in building cities
and communications facilities. The point that is raised em¬
phasizes that Africans do not have to adopt capitalism or com¬
munism but, Sithole asserts, African Socialism because 'all
African countries, except for Rwanda and Burundi, are under¬
populated and the introduction of socialism becomes a relatively
easy matter'. Although he does not elaborate on this super¬
ficial concept of African socialism (Sithole and Shamuyarira's
views on capitalism, socialism and communism are discussed at
length in Chapter Three of this study) the author concludes
that African socialist thinkers (he names Senghor as one of
them) are opposed to 'doctrinaire' socialism, just as they are
saying to capitalism "Hands off Africa" the same applies to




The literature that has been examined in the past few
pages reveals a common assumption that the study of African
nationalism, may !.only be appiro^ohed from the activities and
views of the African leaders of various nationalist movements.
To assume this approach is to conclude that leaders of the na¬
tionalist movements acted on behalf of the African masses and
that whatever action taken and views expressed were a conse¬
quence of African consensus and mandate.
The research proposes to ascertain the extent to which the
claim by the African nationalists in Zimbabwe that they repre¬
sented the interests of the African masses by concretely ac¬
comodating their interests and aspirations in the programs and
objectives of the African nationalist parties are justified ,
and to disclose to what extent the masses participated in and
contributed to the majority of the political activities and
parleys between the minority government and the Zimbabwe na¬
tionalists at the time.
The postulation presented in .this thesis is that special
interests conceived the indifference shown by the nationalists
in their limited analysis of the socio-economic patterns devel¬
oping in the society. It is the purpose of this study to at¬
tempt to bring to light evidence supportive of this assumption
or that in opposition to it. Through an analysis of socio¬
economic patterns in African urban and rural areas I hope to
discern the problems that led to indequate political planning,
hence less political participation in the nationalist movement
by the masses during the most crucial period of African na¬
tionalism.
20
This thesis unfolds in the following manner: Chapter II
discusses the establishment of settler rule, which is the
beginning of serious conflict between Africans and Europeans.
The discussion on African nationalism necessitates a thorough
analysis of settler penetration, and the implementation of
settler rule in Zimbabwe. The reason being that this analysi
reveals the roots of the problem that is the fundamental begi
ning of the conflict between those who were and those who bee
the rules in Zimbabwe. As the discussion will indicate, it
is the attempt to impose white rule and an alien economic
structure that caused African oppression and therefore which
lead to periodic violent confrontations between Africans and
Europeans, exemplified.by the "war,of conquest" in 1893, the
so-called rebellions of 1896 to 1897 and, various strikes and
riots from the early 1920's to the early 1960's.
Chapter II and III will comprise a discussion of develop¬
ments that lead to African nationalism and at the same time
include a discussion of African nationalist movements them¬
selves .
African nationalism in the development of national poli¬
tical bodies (organizations), whose structural function is to
elevate politico-economic and national consciousness among
various elements of a nation in an attempt to coordinate this
impetus for the purpose of common and national interests whic
in the particular case of Rhodesia are national, political
and independence. In order to establish the basic elements
and structure of a party controlled by the masses, a primary
21
source will be the discussion between Paul Sweezy and
40
Bettelheim on the transition to socialism. This survey will
be developed in Chapter IV in conjuction with analysis of events
and accounts discussed in Chapters II and III. This discussion
will set a stage which may make it possible to determine whether
the nationalist movements represented the masses' interests and
whether the nationalists' interests were similar to those of
the masses and if this was not the case, whether there were any
indications that the nationalists would be willing to sacrifice
these interests in favor of the masses.
^^Paul Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On the Transition to
Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
CHAPTER II
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLER RULE
By 18 93 it 'had become clear to King. Lobengula of the
Ndebele that his Kingdom, power and the Ndebele interests that
these stood for were at the verge of collapse. After receiving
depressing information from his spies and observers (one of
whom was killed for what King Lobengula termed his cowardice)
about how formidable Cecil Rhodes' forces were the king was
compelled to follow the advice of his generals and young war-
41
riors. Lobengula's generals had been convinced long before
the King that a military solution could have been the decisive
factor in eliminating Rhodes (they were relying on sheer num¬
bers rather than a thorough analysis of the strength of either
force in terms of military equipment). However, what was pos¬
sible in the past (military might based on mere numbers) was
not possible then because gunfire and cannons proved to be
more decisive in the war of 1893.^^
The area they call Rhodesia today had been inhabited by
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the Shona people since the fourteenth century. The Shona
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community was dominated by various Chieftainships who di¬
rected the activities of the community according to Shona and
religious laws. The most important aspect of the Shona com¬
munity was the, land because they survived and lived by culti¬
vating crops such as millet, a variety of vegetables and
fruits and by hunting and fishing. There was also non-
agricultural production in the form of basket weaving, wood
carving, netting from bark fiber, pottery and iron works for
the manufacture of agricultural implements, knives and spears.
In this community every adult was entitled to land. Although
this short description of Shona existence excludes a very large
part of Shoha history and civilization it will suffice for this
study because a thorough discussion of Shona history, neces-
44
sary as it may be, is beyond the scope of this study.
The Ndebele who earlier had immigrated from the Transvaal
region of South Africa set up their center at Bulawayo in
Southern Rhodesia where they proceeded to invade neighboring
communities for cattle, foodstuffs and labor. The settlement
of the Ndebele in this region created certain relations be¬
tween them and their neighbors which consisted of:
1. the acquisition of tribute from those directly
and partially under the influence of the Ndebele •
King,
2. the accumulation of loot and sometimes captives
generated by periodical raids into those areas
44
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not linked to the Ndebele Kingdom,
3. Cultivating and hunting, the former mostly done
by captives and the latter by Ndebeles.
The strength and driving force behind the Ndebele community
■was animal husbandry, agriculture, the collection of tribute
and military power. Hence:
The division of labor was much more marked than among
the Shona. Higher caste men concentrated their ener¬
gies on hunting, raiding and various martial pursuits,
leaving various of the productive activities to the
women. Cattle herding and the clearing and fencing of
fields were masculine activities but even in their per¬
formance most manual work was done by individuals of
the lowest caste which consisted of the original in¬
habitants of the country.45
A significant aspect of this relationship is that the majority
of the Shona community was not affected by Lobengula's rule,
most of the Shona had not encountered any of Lobengula's armies
since his influence did not extend beyond latitude 19% and
longitude 32%.^^
The war of 1893 between Cecil Rhodes,and King Lobengula
marked the end,of the African modes of existence, especially
the tribute mode of production that was beginning to dominate
this region due to Lobengula's military power. In the place
of African modes of existence Rhodes, whose intentions were
'to see the Union Jack flying from the Cape in the south to
Cairo in the north of Africa' cleared the ground for a capital
intensive economy mainly geared towards extractive enterprises.
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This plan was not meant for the whole country, however, but
mainly for those areas where an abundance of minerals, espe¬
cially gold, was suspected or assumed. Rhodes' intentions,
even though they were an extension of his activities in South
Africa, had developed from his imperialist beliefs and influ¬
ence in the nineteenth century. His intentions and means of
carrying them out,-and those of imperialism in general, are
summed up well by Harry Magdoff when he states:
The drive for foreign investment opportunities and
control over foreign markets brings the level of
political activity on economic matters to a new and
intense level. These means involve wars, valuable
assistants in clearing the way to exercise sufficient
political influence in a foreign land, to obtain pri¬
vileged trade positions, to get ownership of mineral
rights, to remove obstacles to foreign trade and invest¬
ment, to open doors to foreign banks and other finance
institutions which facilitate economic entry and oc¬
cupation.
The tendency of the capitalist system to overpower (i.e.,
dominate) other systems created new social formations and re¬
lations inside Rhodesia. To add to the deteriorating condi¬
tion Rhodes left the African community without a viable admin¬
istration (Such as that which existed before European penetra¬
tion. Contact was minimal and was limited to a periodical
visit by Rhodes' men in search of cheap Black labor. As indi¬
cated above, investment from the south and abroad was mainly •
in extractive enterprises, with more emphasis during the early
part of the nineteenth century on the mining industry. In
fact between 1893 and 1924 the economy of Rhodesia was totally
47
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reliant on the mining industry. In 1924, 72% of Rhodesian
export revenue was derived from mining as a whole, and gold
48
alone accounted for 40% of all export revenue. During the
earlier part of the development of the mining industry in
Rhodesia, and possibly to the middle 1930's, most industries
were labor intensive, thus Rhodes envisaged a reservoir of
cheap Black labor in the surrounding African community. How¬
ever, this did not materialize, at least not in favor of the
mining industries because, as I have stated before in the
paper, the African's means of existence was simple, so was his
consumption utility; purely consisting of cultivating the land
that he owned and living off what he produced (i.e. subsistence
farming of a non-cash nature). To increase African partici¬
pation in the labor system Rhodes' company had to resort to
taxation and forced labor. However, by 1907 the Company had
begun to make concessions to settlers and to encourage European
land settlement hoping to recover its investment from the sale
of land. What had seemed to be abundant amounts of gold re¬
serves in Rhodesia turned out to be a trickle compared to the
South African finds. Hence from this period onwards European
settlement and agriculture became important factors in the
Rhodesian economy.
To bring about African participation in the labor market,
this time not just for the mining industry but for white farms
and European agriculture, the Company had the Africans expro-
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priated from three quarters of the country. In addition to
the land and hut taxes (ten shillings tax on each African male
and ten shillings for each wife exceeding one), there was
added rent on unalientated land (land appropriated but not yet
sold to European, individuals or companies,). Forced labor was
on the increase as:
Native commissioners or inspectors of police called
on the various chiefs and headmen informing villagers
that a certain percent must work for the whiteman in
return for a minimum wage of ten shillings a month as
well as board and lodging; these orders were enforced
by African policemen who often exceeded their authority.
Those Europeans who had acquired land in areas designated
European lands did not encourage Africans to move out of these
areas as had been the case where there was a large concentra¬
tion of Africans. Thus they exacted grazing and dipping fees
on Blacks and:
The moment a man had pegged his farm, he regarded the
African villagers on it as his serfs, who would have
to work for him. The chief means of mobilizing this
pool labor in the first years was the sjambokor hippo-
hide whip and after 1908 labor agreement which committed
tenants to work several months, usually three, for the
privilege of remaining on their ancestral land.50
Even though*African farmers produced more than white farmers
during the earlier part of European settlement, this condi¬
tion changed when the government curtailed African produce
through Euopean traders (buying African produce at very low
prices and selling it at the market price) and by subsidizing
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European agriculture at the expense of the African farmer and
African workers and peasants. Two conditions increased the
non-productivity, of the African fanner, the first one facing
that he did not have a market for his produce (a bottle-neck
situation had been created by the European trader who acted
as middleman), and the second was that he was constantly under
pressure from the government to move to the areas designated
African purchase or reserves, where soil erosion and infertil¬
ity were increasing at an alarming rate due to the over-crowded
situation. Under such a situation, illustrated by land shortage
and forced destocking, the subsistence farmer his family and
his relatives who comprised the neglected majority, found him¬
self starving or selling his labor power to the white farmer
or to the mines. While the condition of the Africans in the
rural areas was deteriorating Africans working in the cities
and mines were facing the same hardships. In the cities
Africans did not have toilet facilities nor did they have
running water’or decent housing. In ,the mines Africans were
deserting in large numbers as a protest against harsh conditions
and forced labor. To shed light on these conditions Onselen
states:
It was precisely because of inadequate food and
housing that the majority of fatalities amongst
Black miners in Rhodesia occurred. This is clear
from the fact that in the twenty years under review
2000 Black workers died from accidents, but in the
same twenty year period over 18,000 workers died
from diseases in the compounds.51
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It was under these conditions that the African people existed
when the settlers asked Britain for self-rule under what they
called Responsible Government in 1923. The conditions that
led to self-rule are summarized below so as to' shed light on
current developments.'
By 1920 the Company had allocated most of the land ac¬
cording to the racial structure that existed in the country,
and had also introduced discriminatory laws coupled with a
growing police force and army to enforce them. With a large
number of Africans pushed to the reserves, with most men worki
on European, farms and ijiines,. and with most African farmers
moved to so-called African purchase areas, a growing number
of settlers were demanding more automony from the Crown. What
had become a thorn to the settlers was Britain's concern with
what it considered the alarming rate at which the company was
selling or giving away the land in the country. According to
52
Henry Vusso Moyana in 1921, the land divisions stood as fol¬
lows :
Alienated Land 31,484,095 , Acres
Native Reserves 21,203,498 "
Unalienated Land 43,529,880 "
However, settlers were divided on whether they had to join the
Union of South Africa or become a self-governing state with a
Dominion status within the British Empire. Hence:
By 8,774 votes to 5,989 largely votes of English
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settlers, who have always constituted the majority
of Europeans, against those of Dutch Boer stock
from South Africa Dominion status won.53
In October 1923, Rhodesia became a self-governing territory
in all respects except for legislation relating to Africans,
railways (which remained under the management of the British
South Africa Company), and international affairs. Therefore,
by the time "Responsible Government" had developed, the socia'
formation and social relations inside Rhodesia were such that
the overall significant pattern was that of the oppressed and
exploited on one side and■exploiter and oppressor on the othei
At this time Africans had been divided into two larger
groups, the largest of which was in the rural areas and the
other in the urban areas. By 1926 the. following number of
Africans was working in the urbanarea:*
Mining and Quarrying 41,336
Factory, Building & Allied trades 8,628
Railways 7,436
Domestic Service 24,917
Shops, Stores and Offices 25,005
In the rural areas 72,000 Africans were employed in Agricultui
and Forestry while the rest who form the majority lived under
a subsistence economy.
Early forms of African Resistance
Although African resistance to. White domination and
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penetration started as early as 1893 more organized forms of
resistance (organization in modern forms such as political
bodies or workers associations) occurred after 1923. The
conditions described above constituted the major target of
most African complaints throught the various organizations
formed during this, period; hence one .cannot refer to them as
nationalist organizations because they were limited to local
and particular grievances as will be illustrated later in this
study. However one can safely add,that.even though these or¬
ganizations were dispersed all over the country, each having
its own grievances, the aggregate of these complaints reflected
national ills. In fact both rural and urban Africans were
aware of various important events that affected their lives
but that they understood their implications is rather doubtful
as will be indicated shortly.
During the period when settlers were deciding on the issue
of joining the Union of South Africa or accepting Dominion
status most of the Africans were viewing this event with great
anxiety because, as T. 0. Ranger states, Africans were hoping
that the settlers would reward their loyalty (since they did not
object to the settler's decision after the referendum of 1922)
with less discrimination and some representation in the country's
legislative assembly. This hope, as one can clearly see, was
based on some misconceptions about what the settlers' demand for
self-rule implied. One such organization, the Rhodesia Bantu
Voters Association, formed in 1923 as a non-political party, re¬
flected the growing resentment to white domination and the de-
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teriorating conditions it had produced. In announcing the
formation of the RBVA Ernest Dube declared:
Perhaps our brothers in South Africa would like to
hear that in Rhodesia the year 1923 will be a year
of events beyond past events, for on January 20, 1923
the brown voters of Rhodesia formed a Union known as
the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association to aim and to
strive for the betterment of the brown race in school
and in government... The brown people of this country
are very backward but we hope that with"the help we
will get from our brothers in South Africa things will
right themselves.54
The RBVA's objectives were:
To endeavor to secure cooperation with the "Powers
that be" and all others interested in the advance¬
ment of the Bantu peoples without laying an embargo
in their way.
To establish co-fraternity among Bantu people and
cooperation and understanding with the ruling race.
The second of these groups was the Rhodesia Native Association
whose leader J. Mokwele, an evangelist's son, believed that
'it will not be the educated that the natives will listen to
but the man of the soil; men who have learnt how to use the
soil and are not ashamed to be seen with their coats off! In
addition to this belief 'to ape civilization cost nothing; its
genuine acquisition must be governed by internal principles
and these imply moral force whose driving power is Christianity
hence any opportunity for improvement...We must thankfully
admit it possible only by the presence of the white man in our
country.' Both the RBVA and RNA were anxious to report to
the Morris Carter Commission what they believed served African
54
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interests as far.as the land issue was concerned. However,
their approach was based on the wrong assumption that the
Carter Commission has been summoned by the Rhodesian government
to represent African opinion on the issue of land. Thus they
welcome the Commission with great enthusiasm hoping to get
concessions from the settler government but to their astonish¬
ment, it recommended that the African reserves be reduced by
57
1,062,460 acres. Infact the Commission had not bothered to
seek the opinion of most Africans because:
We considered that we might do more harm than good
by questioning the natives upon a matter of which
they were very likely to misunderstand the real
scope.58
The strike that occurred at the Shamva mine in 1927 spread its
influence to other working connunities in the country. Most
significant in this aspect was the formation of the ICU which
not only was critical of the missionaries but also of the
'timidity of the elite.' The ICU developed as a radical working
man's organization but fell short of being radical enough to
demand the working man's rights v/ithout having to be submissive
to the settler exploiters. Its basis therefore was the griev¬
ance of the worker, as one of its founders James Mhaso asserted
You will understand that a man who is hungry will never
be quiet...We want the government to know that the native
is starving.... .We ask the government to give us sufficient
pay, but we do not want the same pay as Europeans. We
will be obedient but we must complain...If the white peo-
c 7




pie did not believe in uplifting the native they
should have left us in darkness. We'are workers
suffering.-
This short paragraph does not however indicate the ICU's
numerous activities but the satement by Mhaso sums up their
intensity and significance in resisting European domination,
which, as far as these early organizations are concerned amou
to very little.
Certainly, these early organizations lacked a strategy
for action and organization of the African people. That thes
African bodies were aware of certain African grievances is
evident in their statements but that they represented African
needs and interests on a national.basis is discredited by
their narrowness and small scale actions. To take the Matabe
Home Society as a case in point, its objectives were narrowed
to ethnic appeals and since the Ndebele comprised a fraction
of the total population of Rhodesia (a small minority at that
its support never exceeded its confined activities among the
Ndebele. The Rhodesian government could not acquiesce to its
demands (althought it certainly welcomed its divisive and
limited approach) because it regarded a united Ndebele nation
as a threat to its very existence; an assertion which stems
from the European belief that the Ndebele have always been a
warlike people. Besides, the very demands to form an inde¬
pendent entity vis-a-vis the newly created European state
contradicted the very essence of white economics and politics
and their labor intensive industries. The RBVA was also
59
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mainly based in ..p.ulawayo and this condition curtailed its
activities in other parts of the country which needed repre¬
sentation. Right from its formation the RBVA was a docile
organization which could not have survived any frustration
and harassment by the government had it chosen to do so. The
organization's submissiveness and misconceptions of white at¬
titudes towards Africans (that Britain, the long civilized
nation, was a lover of justice and liberty for all her inferii
and hopeless subjects) raised doubts among the oppressed and
exploited who suffered under police brutality and strict ad¬
ministration. They wondered, how these worshipers of the very
system that confined them could solve the land and poverty pr(
blems. This frustration and certainly the roots of the whole
problem did not, therefore, lie on the desire of the European;
to 'forbid the natives to walk on the foot-paths'. Which is
a secondary matter, but on the basic and fundamental economic
and social structure that these laws protected.
The ICU had also failed to represent the workers' needs
in a way that could bring about better working conditions.
It put too much emphasis on concessions without creating an
atmosphere (unitary demands, organized strikes and sick pre¬
tences etc..), that could convince those responsible of the .
necessity for concessions. Worker unreadiness for action in
Rhodesia stemmed from lack of organization in the worker'
communities, in the reserves and the surrounding territories,
where most of the labor came from. There was also the tenden<
for African leaders and those concerned to mystify reality
36
rather than present a thorough analysis of concrete situations
and conditions. Masoja reveals some of the difficulties ex¬
perienced by the ICU:
I have been told that some of our members may demand
the return of their subscription if we fail to obtain
better conditions for them. Does a native expect the
return of the money he pays to the churches who pro¬
mise him a paradise which he has not yet attained?60
One would conclude from Masoja Ndlovu's statement that there
was still a wide gap between what the ICU leaders expected and
what the workers were willing to do. There are many reasons
why the religious African could not have demanded his money
from the churches. Besides the fact that the missionary was
clever enought to promise paradise after death (Africans took
their church fees as investments for an unknown and fearful
future) , this.' mystification of. reality was accompanied by con¬
crete action such as schools, health and other social facilities
which the African could associate with the church and at the
same time he could feel that he was part of the whole process.
What Ndlovu failed to see was that the missionary had in¬
corporated whatever satisfied the most sensitive needs of
Africans into his religion in order to divert the worker's
attention from the real source (cause) of his deteriorating
political situati.on and economic conditions which given time,
and with the help of those Africans who were more aware of the
need for action, the workers would identify sooner or later.




concrete action, inadequate as it was, as opposed to the
mystification of reality exemplified by the Watch Tower Organ¬
ization (an African Religious Organization) which came in re¬
sponse to the establishment of Self-rule or Reponsible Govern¬
ment in 1923.^^
The Watch Tower had not only told its followers to store
grain because another Boer-British war was imminent but it had
also informed them that Self-rule meant the coming of the whole
world (a kind of twentieth century "bullets will turn into
water" mystification that characterized the revolts in 1896-97).
However, since ICU claimed to be representative of the workers'
needs and aspirations (used to have May Day processions in the
6 2
streets) one would conclude that the leaders would have ap¬
preciated :
...the sociological connection between religious be¬
lief and practice on the one hand, and poverty on the
other. People who are most aggressively religious are
the poorer people; for, in accordance with the Marxist
analysis, religion is social, and contemporary reli¬
gious forms and practices have their main root in the
social depression of workers.63
Necessary as these early organizations were it seems fair to
conclude that they would have made more positive and concrete
contributions had they spent most of their energy attempting
to educate and politicize the majority of those Africans who
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building a firm foundation for future political organizations,
rather than aiming at trying to prove to those least concerned
with African development that the time had come for this minute
proportion of the educated Africans to be recognized as the
leadership and clique representing the majority of Africans.
The implementation of Europeans (settler) political,
social, and economic structures and their oppressive factors
were the cause of African resentment toward settler rule as
the wars, African riots, and demonstrations proved. However,
African protest against settler oppression in different sec¬
tions of the country could only bring concrete pressure on
European power if Africans brought together these isolated
incidents into one strong united force. As the previous chap¬
ter shows settler rule had created certain conditions that
were different’ from those that existed before European pene¬
tration exemplified by African poverty and apathy in rural
areas, diseases in mines, and idleness and poor working condi¬
tions in urban areas.
The attempt to unite all disatisfied Africans from all
over the country lead to the formation of large African or¬
ganizations, national in scope and strongly influenced by the
seemingly changing political and social conditions in other
African countries. The next chapter will analyse the form¬
ation of these African organizations which later became na¬
tionalist parties and their aims and achievements.
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM
«
Immediately after the Second World War, a world shortage
of raw materials and foodstuffs, and the Rhodesian government
intervention to encourage industrialization (due to increased
pressure from the national bourgeoisie) gave rise to a variety
of industries topped by those in manufacturing. Several state
enterprises were founded the most important of which were, the
Electric Supply Commission (Power Stations), the Rhodesian
Iron and Steel Commission (Founderies and Mills), the Cotton
Industry Board Mills and the Sugar Industry Board. To facil¬
itate a smooth and swift implementation of its economic poli¬
cies the government had, for the whole decade beginning in 1930,
passed various acts which are discussed below. The infamous
Land Apportionment Act was passed in 1930 to enable the govern-
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ment to divide the country into European and African lands.
Land apportionment in Rhodesia in 1930 was as follows
European Areas 49,149,174 acres
Native Reserves and areas 28,591,606 acres
The rest of the 96,213,120 acres fell under the categories of
Unassigned, Undetermined and Forest areas. As can be determined
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from the figures above the Europeans got 51% of the land while
Africans who outnumbered them 21:1 obtained only 28.9%. To
make matters worse in an already deteriorating condition the
government gave most of the fertile and arable land to the
Europeans such that:
...the official geological map shows that by 1970,
98% of the land suitable for afforestation, fruit
and intensive beef production lay in the European
areas, as did 82% of the land for intensive farming.
100% of the land unsuitable for any agricultural
purpose lay in the African sector.66
The Maize Control Act of 1931 was meant to discourage the
African farmer from competing with his European counterpart
and at the same time it give the government an excuse to build
6 7roads and railways only in the European section. The Tobacco
Marketing Act of 1936 limited competition among tobacco growers
since the government could buy tobacco from African farmers at
very low prices and sell it at market prices (tobacco had be-
6 8
come the largest agricultural export). The Native Registra¬
tion Act enabled the government to divide the distribution of
the African labor supply into strategic components so as to
make it easier for authorities to direct labor where it was
needed most, regardless of whether the African worker was willing
to work under such conditions. The Act, therefore, tightened
the existing Pass Laws such that white farmers received all the
ft f
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unskilled labor they needed and at the same time paid the
, . 69lowest wages.
The Industrial Conciliation ' Act of 1934 and its ammend-
ment in 1937 established industrial boards composed of Unions
and their employers under which white workers and employers
could agree on wage changes and working conditions. African
workers were not considered as employees hence they were ex-
70
eluded from this agreement and from Unions in general. The
exclusion of Africans from unions was based on the governments'
fear of organized Black protest but also fear by white workers
that competition for jobs would increase with the increase in
Black subscription to Unions. Thus:
That is one of the dangers we face..a big mass
of Blacks paying minimum contributions and pro¬
ducing maximum capital, with the power that goes
with it because as we know, money is more powerful.
The amendment to this act rather than accepting Africans as
Employees with rights to influence Union decisions, brought
them under white control so that their strength was checked.
In one such case:
...the Africans in the Printing Industry would
become members of a workers association attached
to the Typographical Union and we should have some
measure of control over it.72
At this point, one can safely conclude that most of these Acts
were passed in response to white pressure groups. The Land
®^Ibid., p. 201.
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Apportionment Act had appeased the white rural bourgeoisie by
assigning better.land and cheap Black labor to its satisfac¬
tion and also checking and limiting Black competition. The
Industrial Concilliation Act gave the white workers security
by giving them the right to control Black workers through pri¬
mitive linions and at the same time limiting their competition
for better paying jobs and conditions.
What altered these relations between the African workers
one one side and white employers and workers on the other (even
though this alteration could hardly be called significant by
world standard), was the direction the Rhodesian economy took
after World War II. As has already been indicated above, ex¬
ternal and some internal demands stimulated the growth of the
manufacturing sector; hence a new significant manufacturing
class developed. Between 1949 and the beginning of the Feder¬
ation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 233.7 million pounds were
invested in Rhodesia with 70% of this investment coming from
abroad. That the successive white regimes in Rhodesia have
always encouraged foreign investment is evident from the large
number of foreign companies operating in the country today but
what is more significant is the fact that after World War II
most of this foreign investment was in manufacturing. Half of
the white workers employed in the industrial sector were in
the manufacturing industry and were immigrants attracted by
abundant employment opportunities arid high standards of living.
As in most peripheries proceeds from the economy went to foreign
investors in alliance with the minority white ruling class. The
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growth of manufacturing did not only require skilled and semi
skilled labor but also a large market at home for some of the
commodities. ‘ Therefore, with increasing growth in manufactur
and distribution the white community alone could not suffice
as a market (in other words it could not satisfy the growing
voracity among the manufactures for more profits).
Government spending on African education has always been
insignificant compared to its spending on European education.
However, by 1948 the government had begun to increase its
spending on African education although it still had quite a
long way to go before it could satisfy even the simplest need





One would suspect that one of the reasons for the slight in¬
crease in government spending on African education was due to
the growth of industries that needed skilled and semi-skilled
labor to cut down production costs thus increasing production
Between, 1946-1965 the number of Africans employed in
manufacturing had almost quadrupled from 36,389 to 110,000'.
The highest paying sectors of the economy were transport and
communications, banking and financing, education, health and
manufacturing. The sectors with the highest African employme
were agriculture and forestry but they paid the lowest wages,
while one of the sectors with the lowest African employment.
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Transport and Comitiunications, paid the highest, as the 1965-
figures show.* The economic expansion after the Second World
War and capital inflow from England and South Africa created
a further change in the African community. Additional social
groups developed as a result of the expansion of certain sec¬
tors thus benefiting certain Africans such as teachers, ad¬
ministrators, top civil servants, police officers and other
professionals. The nationalist, leaders were among the poli¬
tical elite who had gone to South Africa for further education
before Rhodesia had its own educational facilities. The middle
class was in the main created by the educational and administra¬
tive systems introduced under colonialism. By the late 1940's
and early 1950's the following Africans were found in urban
areas around the country, business men, shop-keepers, clerks,
religious leaders, artisans, semi-skilled workers, manual
workers, migrant workers and '-domestic servants' . In the rural
areas there were less than 9,000 'master farmers', around 6,000
plot holders, 90 cooperatives and the rest (the majority of
the African population) were subsistence farmers, mostly women,
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children and males above 35 years of age. A high percent of
men between the ages of 16 and 35 were either in urban areas
or in the mines and other places where cheap labor was needed. .
Two factors were common among the majority of Africans;
the first being that they were all paid very low wages and the
*See Appendix A
^^Colin Leys, op. cit., pp. 107-172.
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second that they were all discriminated against one way or
another. The very few who survived these two factors were
either top civil workers, top post police officers or members
of parliament. The most affected were rural workers in the
agricultural section (the highest number of workers in the
country) who were not only paid the lowest wage in the country
but also worked under the worst conditions. The next group
that seemed to benefit the least from this economic expansion
was women, children and older men under subsistence economy
who suffered from land shortage, hunger and disease, lack of
educational facilities and in addition to this had to carry
the weight of those in the urban areas who either did not have
\
employment or had to return to the reserves because the white
man no longer required their services. To add to the deteri¬
orating situation, the government had set up such a repressive
system under traditional rulers that any discontent was muted
(mostly through police brutality) before it reached those most
concerned with African interests.
A short note on the system of government in the rural
areas might shed light on the confining conditions underwhich
most rural Africans existed. The country was divided into
about fifty districts and each district was under a District
Commissioner who in turn had an African administration under
him. The chiefs and headmen were responsible for enforcing
the laws and rules of the settler regime and the African
police and kraalheads were the immediate tools for this exer¬
cise. It was through the African administration and the Dis-
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trict Coitimissloners that the African nationalists could ob¬
tain permission to hold meetings among the peasants, and the
District Commissioner in turn reported to the Secretary of
Internal Affairs and so on. In the late 1950's and early
1960's the government had banned all political meetings in
rural areas, thus the peasants were even denied freedom of speec
and association (it was illegal to meet or associate with more
than three people at any given time, and the chiefs and headmen
were there to enforce these laws).
The needs of those Africans in the rural areas are not
hard to recognize following the discussion in the paragraphs
above but a very short description of the needs of a few more
groups would serve an expository purpose. The workers in the
urban areas needed better working and living conditions and
the town-dwellers who were either unemployed or just living in
the city, and the prostitutes (a thriving business in urban
areas in both Black and white sections) needed some form of
assistance. Professionals, very few lawyers and doctors, etc.,
could not find employment because of discriminatory laws,
(Herbert Chitepo left the country for this very reason).
Teachers wanted promotions and other higher paying jobs and cer¬
tain skilled workers wanted supervisory and even managerial,
positions. To complement these needs and demands more and
more Africans were becoming aware of the 'progress' of their
counter-parts in other African countries and were thus becoming
impatient with the discriminatory tendencies of the ruling
white minority. Whereas the removal of all racial barriers
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might have brought about positive changes for those in high
levels of the social structure (those who believed that they
were only a 'discriminatory-law' away from progress) the ma¬
jority of Africans would remain under those conditions but
with the false impression that it was only a matter of time
before they too joined their successful fellowmen. But Leys
points out:
The racial equality thus established in principle
does not yet mean that Africans anywhere hold jobs
on a par with Europeans working in the same time,
but it is the companies' intention (and in their
interest) that this should eventually happen.
In the white community the two major groups weilding electoral
power in Rhodesia emerged after World War II (the two are dis¬
cussed later in this study); their interests were bound to
conflict in the future. These were the Rural bourgeoisie and
the white workers on one hand and the national manufacturing
class on the other. It is the latter group that had more in¬
fluence in the creation of conditions that led to the develop¬
ment of the African nationalist movement. Consequently:
To strengthen its political position vis-a-vis the
rural bourgeoisie, the manufacturing class sought
political alliance with the emerging African petty-
bourgeoisie and middle class. To achieve this the
white manufacturing class, which was strongly behind
the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
pushed for the relaxation of racial laws and advocated
non-racial economic competition. This effort was carried
out under the banner of the "Politics of Partnership".75
^"^Ibid. , p. 113 .
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This period of anxiety and expectations among certain members
of the African community marks the beginning of African na¬
tionalism in Rhodesia or to put it realistically, the beginning
of African nationalist movements. As already pointed out ear¬
lier in this study, there had existed in the 1920's and 1930's
various African organizations but they were not national in
scope. They were also very conciliatory too cowardly and very
unclear on issues that pertained to the basic causes of the
exploitation and oppression of Africans. One factor most com¬
mon among them was that they all tended to be formed immedi¬
ately as a result of some big event and then faded away as the
excitement diminished.
Formation of Political Policies
Nationalist movements, as most nationalist leaders and
politicians in general agree, began with the merger of the CYL,
which had successfully staged a boycott of city buses in Sali-
bury in 1956, and the revived ANC based in Bulawayo. They
formed the "militant" ANC under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo
and had as its first Statement of Principles and Policy Program
...national unity of all the inhabitants of the
country in true p,artnership, regardless .of race
color or creed. It stands for a complete inter-
grated society; equality of opportunity in every
sphere; and the social, economic and political
advancement of all. It regards these objectives
as the essential foundation of that partnership
between people of all races, without which there
can be no peaceful progress in this country. Con¬
gress affirms complete loyalty to the Crown as the
symbol of national unity...It is not a racial move¬
ment. It is equally opposed to tribalism and ra¬
cialism. It welcomes as members all of every race
who are in sympathy with its aims, and are prepared
to fulfil the conditions of membership.
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It believes the country can advance only through
non-racial thinking and acting, that an integrated
society provides the only alternative to tribalism
and .racialism
Garfield Todd, leader of the United Rhodesia Party (URP),
was ousted by members of his own party from his position as
Prime Minister because he was considered an ultraliberal. So
at a congress called by a majority of the members of URP, Gar¬
field Todd lost to Edgar Whitehead 129 votes to 193 on March 2,
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1958. Early the following year protest marches were organized
exemplified by the boycott of all shops belonging to non-members
7 8
of the ANC. However, Whitehead's government was not inured
to African protests and what it termed the disruption of a
stable economy and political structure. Whitehead declared a
State of Emergency and introduced a bill in parliament that
would give severe repressive powers to police and civil servants
such that they could arrest anyone at anytime with or without
warrants, seize books and other equipment used by nationalists
and impose fines. When the government.banned the ANC that year
it arrested most of its leaders except for Nkomo who was in
London (he immediately exiled himself from Rhodesia until 1960).
The reason for banning the ANC was, according to Whitehead,
that there was a .growing tendency in the movement to cause
people in both urban and rural areas to defy the law. The ANC
had tried to encourage the government through protest marches
Shamuyarira, op. cit. ,
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fiery speeches and sometimes organized defiance of discrimatory
laws, to remove what the nationalists considered to be unnece-
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sary barriers to economic and political progress.
After the ANC was banned, the National Democratic Party
(NDP) was formed in January 1960 with Leopold Takawira as act¬
ing President. Its Statement of Principles was:
...to serve as a vigorous political vanguard for re¬
moving all forms of oppression, and for the establish¬
ment of a democratic government in Southern Rhodesia,
with the object of having a government elected on the
principle of 'One Man One Vote': to work for the edu¬
cational, political, social and economic emancipation
of the people especially the underprivileged; to work
with other democratic movements in Africa and the
rest of the world, with a view of abolishing colonial¬
ism, racialism, tribalism and all forms of national or
racial oppression and economic inequalities among na¬
tions, races, .'peoples... ^0
The NDP's main task was to reconstruct what it considered to
be a necessary constitution for Southern Rhodesia which would
enable Africans to hold seats either as a government or a
strong opposition. Britain would be the external power that
would implement and enforce this constitution since she was
responsible for African affairs. Hence the demand by na¬
tionalists that Britain reject the demand by Whitehead that the
country relinquish its,reserved powers (under the 1923 consti¬
tution the British Government had the power to veto any leg¬
islation and lai^s that discriminated against Africans in favor
of Europeans but Britain never used them). During the consti¬
tutional conference between Nkomo and Whitehead's parties.
"^^Ibid. , pp. 45-57.
^*^Ibid. , p. . 66 .
under the auspices of the British Government, Nkomo initially
accepted the 1961,Constitution but later on rejected it after
encountering opposition from some of his executives. What had
seemed to be a fair start towards African maioritv rule by White-
head was rejected by Nkomo in a delayed move that Whitehead
considered to be treacherous. Nkomo had to show his followers
that what seemed to be a let down of African interests was
nothing but a technical error created by the ambiguity of the
proposals in the 1961 Constitution. The ANC on one hand be¬
lieved that either Whitehead had to be forced to the negotiating
table or Britain had to be force to pressure Whitehead to ac¬
cept African demands. Therefore they were prepared to use
African violence to disrupt this 'stable economy and political
structure'. The riots and demonstrations that occurred during
this period rather reveal less about Nkomo and his followers'
attempts to make his threats materialize than about the fact
that the majority of rural and urban Africans had been or¬
ganized into a strong force that could resist settler domina¬
tion. Whitehead on the other hand was not prepared to let the
nationalists topedo what he had hoped was a fair compromise
between the extremists and the moderate whites who comprised
the electorate. Hence to prove to the settler community that
a few 'extremist nationalist thugs' could not destroy the
spirit of "partnership', he introduced a bill to enable him
to declare a State of Emergency anytime, to arrest anyone who
breaks this law and fine him, arrest anyone who did not have
proof that he had an honest settled way of life and honest
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means of living, and to send these 'vagrants' to re-establish¬
ment centers. In addition to these laws, stoning of automobiles
would be tantamount to attempted murder with a five year impri¬
sonment sentence and a large fine. Chiefs Sigola and Kaisa
blamed the NDP for rural disturbances and Whitehead used the
newly implemented Law and Order Maintenance Act to ban NDP in
December 1962 because, he said, the party had resorted to
violence and intimidation.
Ten days after NDP was banned another nationalist party,
ZAPU, emerged with Nkomo as its leader and its policies were:
To establish the policy of One Man One Vote as the
basis of government in this country. To unite the
African people so that they liberate themselves from
all forms of imperialism and colonialism.
ZAPU shall maintain and instill the spirit of Pan-
Africanism in Zimbabwe.
It shall work cooperatively with any movement in
Africa or else-where which fosters the spirit of
Pan-Africanism.
ZAPU shall observe, respect and promote human
rights contained in the declaration of Human
Rights of the United Nations Charter.
It shall cooperate with any such international
forces as are- genuinely engaged in the struggle
for the total and immediate liquidation of
colonialism and imperialism.
Unlike the ANC whose task was to encourage the government to
remove all racial barriers, (a condition some whites especially
the manufacturing class believed would hasten the pace for
progress) or the NDP whose task was to settle the constitu¬
tional question (a constitution that had been drafted as a
compromise between the extremist and moderate settlers to
enable only an insignificant number of token Blacks to repre-
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sent African interests thus checking the mounting dissatis¬
faction among Africans). ZAPU had no other choice but to use
a different strategy and the Statement of Principles reveals
that ZAPU was taking the events occurring in other African
countries seriously. Nkomo had to take into consideration the
will of his immediate followers, therefore, the 1961 Constitu¬
tion would not have accomodated most of their interests, be¬
sides, his close associates in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
were only months away from independence. Whitehead's primitive
repressive laws were a response to Nkomo's rejection of the
1969 Constitution, and also a response to the violence that
was mounting in the urban areas. Captial and investment had
dropped because of the seemingly unstable conditions that the
violent situation had caused during the most crucial period
of African nationalist movements. Not only were the white
rural bourgeoisie and"white workers (the extremist forces who
did not feel that Africans had to be allowed to even get this
far in demanding their rights) disturbed by this violence but
they also felt that African nationalism in Rhodesia, like
African nationalism in other parts of Africa, was bent on de¬
stroying a system which was the very basis of settler power.
It may be possible that Nkomo's fiery rhetoric and 'lack of
control' of this violence disturbed the manufacturing class
since they had believed all along that Africans would accept
the fifteen seats provided by the 1969 Constitution (possibly)
a belief that stemmed from a false conclusion that African na¬
tionalist leaders were true representatives of African interests
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and aspirations). After all when this class sought to en¬
courage the government to remove racial barriers it was not
interested in the welfare and development of the masses (the
very cause of their high profits because of the low wages that
they paid them), it only sought votes from the African petty-
bourgeoisie and middle class so as to establish a system that
not only increased their profits but also increased stability
by checking the wrath of the common people. However, ZAPU was
banned in September 1962 and most of its leaders were arrested
and the reason givon for this action by Whitehead was that
ZAPU had become too violent and that it was the governments
duty to maintain law and order. The day ZAPU was banned the
government ordered police to guard the airports, power stations
and strategic installations. All members of the party were
told to turn in their cards or else face a $3,000 fine and
five years imprisonment. Eight thousand paratroopers were
placed in various sections of the country to guard against vio-
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lence and sabotage.
A brief analysis of the African nationalist movement at
this time could shed some light on its shortcomings and possi¬
bly the reasons why the settlers ended up swinging to the ex¬
treme right. That Nkomo and his immediate followers were
products of the economic and social conditions that had even¬
tuated from the economic boom period of 1946-1963 is not hard
to discern since their response to government stimuli was
^^New York Times, 25 January, 1962, p. 22.
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similar to that of their counterparts in Northern Rhodesia,
Malawi and even a few other African countries. But unlike his
counterparts in the other territories of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland whose settler community (the majority
of it) had fled to Rhodesia, Nkomo faced a large intransigent
settler community which had attempted (because of the need for
economic development through foreign investment, the greatest
amount of which was in manufacturing and distribution) to
reach a compromise by accepting the 1961 Constitution with the
hope that Whitehead would successfully sell it to the African
leaders, and he almost did. The compromise reached through
the 1961 Constitution was that if the Africans accepted the
fifteen seats this would not pose as a threat to the rural
bourgeoisie and the white workers since they could have the
power to control legislation on one hand, and on the other
hand the fifteen seats and a gradual relaxation of discrimi¬
natory laws would bring a few more Africans into the higher
social structure as leaders and representatives of the people
thus satisfying the manufacturing class and at the same time
'stabilizing' the situation. But Nkomo and his executive after
being fooled by MacMillan's 'winds of change' speech were under
the illusion that the 1961 Constitutional conference signaled
the end of white rule as was the case in most African countries.
The African nationalists could not recognize the different
forces at play in Rhodesia, that of British economic interests
and settler power. The settlers wanted to retain white power
and 'Western standards' of living and as long as this meant
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better conditions for economic exploitation (stability) Britain
was not willing to encourage any change of government, after
all "Africans were not yet ready to run the complex industrial
structure". Nkomo, Silundika, Chitepo and Sithole accepted
the 1961 Constitution in London (they were products of economic
and social conditions that needed African intermediaries and
advisors) because it provided what the ANC and NDP sought, as
their Statements of Principles show. The nationalist leaders
who forced Nkomo to reject this constitution could not have
done so because they had the people's interests in mind since
the constitutional conference had not been mandated by the
majority of the Africans. Besides Nkomo had stated the reasons
for NDP's participation in the constitutional conference as:
We in the NDP have never talked in terms of seats.
We are only interested in shaping the electoral
law so that no one party can manipulate electoral
law.83
The formation of ZAPU and the direction it took represents a
desire by the nationalist leaders to create as much disruption
of the economy and political structure as possible so that
African countries and those sympathetic to the nationalist
cause would pressure Britain to force the settlers to the nego¬
tiating table. Evidently the nationalist leaders spent most
of their time in Britain and the United Nations in the early
sixties. In Britain they were telling'the British that the
Congo should be a lesson of how violent Africans can be and
at the United Nations they were seeking the adoption of a re-
8 3
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solution that would maintain that Rhodesia was still a British
colony and Britain could still use its veto powers. What ZAPU
failed to realize was that by claiming that they had control
over African violence, spontaneous as it was, they were pulling
the rug from under Whitehead's feet but not from the’ other
half of the white electorate comprising the extremists, who
viewed Whitehead's policies and actions as too moderate. These
threats could not please the rest of the white electorate con¬
sisting of the moderates because they saw a right-wing govern¬
ment as being able to eliminate African discontent temporarily
by banishing the few 'trouble makers' to remote areas thus
serving their interests and those’ of international capital
(after all they could play a better intermediary role than
Africans). As for the masses of Africans the settler regime
constantly proselytized them by falsifying the standard of edu¬
cation and living as being higher in Rhodesia and South Africa
than in all other African states. To secure foreign investment
and international capital the settler regime began to talk of
'Responsible Government' or government being in the hands of
those who want tO' preserve 'Western Civilization'. The result,
a major boost to the Rhodesian regime even during the period
of sanctions; the exports to the United States of chrome,
asbestos and other materials, amounting to $13 million between
the 1960's and 1972, shot up to $30 million in 1973.
A review of the above information on the initial stages
of African nationalism, its development, progression, and
achievement reveals that the nationalist movement had suffered
thru judicial prejudices and military oppression.
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The settler government not only managed to forcefully
remove the nationalist and rank and file leaders to restric¬
tion area (concentrated camps) but had also retarded African
political progress by cutting off the link between the na¬
tionalists and the workers and peasants. From this position
it is essential to discuss settler government actions against
Africans, and what appeared to be failures in the nationalist
movement and therefore the effects of these frustrations on
the future and important aims of the nationalist movements.
CHAPTER IV
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM
The question to be raised in this chapter is the crucial
point of whether the African Nationalist movement was the people
and the people the movement? Did the nationalist movement in
its development and its demise represent the national needs
and common interests' of the 750,000 person labor force and
the three or so million African farmers, women and children
who formed the majority residing in the rural areas?
The analysis of events occurring in Rhodesia since the
war of 1893 reveals that the development of capitalism and its
perpetuation wer the main and foremost cause of conflict and
resentment between Africans and Europeans. To realize and to
cultivate the conditions that Cecil Rhodes had created, the
settlers were determined to develop that part of the economy
which was essential for their survival by checking the develop¬
ment of underdevelopment through government action and subsidies.
To complement this process they also created an artificial
condition whereby the minority settler community would advance
and develop at the expense of the African majority by some
form of primitive legislation to tax and force the Africans
into the labor system, and to prevent them from being repre¬
sented in the governing institutions and competing with the
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settlers. As has already been pointed out above, industrial¬
ization, especially secondary industries, necessitated foreign
investment; a necessary condition for this investment was
'stability' hence Whitehead's brutal suppression and frus¬
tration of African nationalist movements. The situation de¬
veloped into that characterized by the African oppressed and
exploited on one .side and the European oppressors and ex¬
ploiters on the other. This was the fundamental basis for
conflict and therefore, the basis for any struggle towards
national consciousness and liberation. This being the situa¬
tion, the desired goals and objectives of a movement bent on
creating conditions that would enable the masses to bring the
necessary changes into being could not have materialized under
the form and approach that African nationalists movements •
molded themselves. Any movement guided by these goals and ob¬
jectives had to begin from the masses themselves, since they
were directly affected by the repressive settler system and
deteriorating economic and social conditions. Thus, they use
this situation as a basis for the articulation of an ideology
which motivates a genuine movement of the masses. Its function
would necessarily be to impart, this abstraction at the level
which the masses can anticipate as they organize themselves
and proceed to adhere to those assignments and duties that cor¬
respond to their basic needs and interests. The importance
of ideology as the basis of any development of a movement of
the people stems from the fact that when Europeans penetrated
Rhodesia they destroyed what had previously been the Africans
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way of life and whatever had been the driving force behind it.
In other words they attempted to eliminate the very basis for
the historical development of African society, its culture,
and in its place created a condition whereby that part of the
country that did not serve their purpose, the rural areas,
were constantly being underdeveloped and the African population
being forced at an alarming rate into a condition of non-pro¬
ductivity and apathy. Africans had been removed from the
control of their means of production to a situation where they
had to sell their labor power for a very low price. It would
seem only inevitable that any party or movement which claimed
to represent African needs would attempt to re-create a situa¬
tion such that the true and permanent motive force of history,
the mode of production, is raised to even higher levels where
the advancement of the forces of production could enhance ef¬
ficient development of the means of production for the parti¬
cipation and benefit of all. Because in Rhodesia the majority
of Africans comprised the labor force and the peasants in rural
areas, the peoples movement would have to accept this fact that
these two forces determine the direction to be taken in the
attempt to formulate efficient social and economic planning.
But this conclusion could come only after an analysis of
the social structure in Rhodesia; the analysis, therefore of
the driving force behind the oppressive system imposed on the
Africans. This analysis would indicate that the search for
profits and the maintenance of privileges (high standard of
living) for whites at the expense of the majority was the fuel
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for white domination and at the same time the main source of
the unbearable heat that the Africans were trying desperately
to eliminate. A further anlaysis could reveal that the con¬
flict between Blacks and Whites is a reflection of the con¬
tradiction between social production and private approporiation
of value produced; this follows from the generally known fact
that the capitalists, only organize the production of only what
is profitable and not what the workers and peasants need and
can purchase. The workers are only used to work for wages
(this is the only means of their survival without work they
cannot survive) and to produce for exchange. The capitalists
do not concern themselves with the conditions under which these
laborers work as long as production and labor costs are low.
The peasants on the other hand., seemingly satisfied with
subsistence economies, cannot exist in this poverty for a long
time because without planned and efficient production land
loses its fertility and the condition.of the peasant deterio¬
rates. Hence to include the peasants' interests as the basis
for the formation of a peoples movement means that the party
is prepared to change the whole organization and purpose for
production so that the material and cultural standards of the
people can be constantly raised. This section of the African
population which is the majority will necessarilly determine
the pace and forms of reaching the desired goal. In the parti¬
cular case of Rhodesia, what seemed to be possible in Zambia
and Malawi during their nationalist movements could not be
transferred to the country because of the settler's intran-
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sigence. But this situation created by the settlers also re¬
vealed that the needs of the masses had to be seriously con¬
sidered otherwise the potential threat of violence constantly
used by African nationlists could not materialize; and it did
not materialize during the most crucial point of African
nationalism because the masses were not part of the movement.
The most artificial actions taken in the rural areas were the
use of empty slogans by African nationalists ("independence is
around the corner") designed to rally support but at the same
time they were quite removed from economic and social reality.
It should have been clear to the nationalists that these ac¬
tions which induce spontaneous uprisings would not necessarily
bring about national consciousness among the majority of
Africans; a condition which was lacking even up to the time
the leaders left the country to form movements in exile. What
was a necessary conditon then, was to enable the peasants to
prepare themselves for full participation in the production
process.
...production is a social activity, this means that
to get at the heart of the problem of production,
we must first and foremost focus on people and the
social relations into which they enter. Unless we
put people as producers and people as consumers at
the center of our analysis, we lose sight of what
it is all about.
Lack of ideology as the basis of the nationalist movement needs
further discussion so as to disclose why the African movements
sooner or later found themselves frustrated by settler brutal
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suppression on one hand and lack of African response on the
other. Ideology essentially accomodates the views of the whole
society, i.e., its definite conditions, its mode of production,
8 5
its social relations and its aims and interests. Hence it
is part of the material life of a given society and also de¬
velops as a consequence of the development of the material
life of the society. Its importance stems from the fact that
it is a reflection of the real world in the form of abstract
ideas. Similarly the African leaders through the people could
have attempted to understand and give account of the conditions
in which they lived and the outside forces that affected and
effected these conditions so that whatever ideas they produced
would be of service to the whole population under the circum¬
stances. This understanding would then be developed as a
coherent system of ideas which adjust and agree with the facts
so far as they and the people have experienced and become con¬
scious of them. But the importance of understanding these
conditions and articulating them would have served the na¬
tionalists well in creating conditions among the people that
would act as barriers to the already deteriorating situation
of constant bombardment of the African population with negative
abstract ideas meant to serve white interests. In other words
the development of,an ideology would serve the purpose of count-
teracting the negative aspects of the Africans' way of life
8 5
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imposed by the dominant settler minority by imparting a positive
non-illusory ideology from concrete and real social and eco¬
nomic conditions. This is, however, not an easy task taking
into consideration that the dominant settler minority has as
its disposal every possible means of inculcating these intel¬
lectual instruments (forged in correspondence to their material
position and requirements) to serve their definite interests.
The schools that mobt Africans have the bgming desire to attehd
are in most cases supervised by missionaries, who have been in
the forefront in attempting to destroy African culture, and
have been used as centers for the inculcation of illusory
ideology.
The importance of understanding the effects of ideology
as a tool used to serve white interests lies not only in how
it has managed to confuse the African even on issues that he
could discern if he took time to but also on the fact that any
development of abstract ideas by Africans should essentially
be based on concrete conditions. This assertion will act as a
guard against the inculcation of illusory abstract ideas de¬
veloped only for the African's consumption. A case in point
is that of the Rhodesian government which spends millions more
on European institutions of higher learning (especially those
involved in technology) and an'insignificant amount on African
technological institutions, if any exist, and then turns to
the African student expressing his views about the inferiority
of the Black race in such technical subjects as mathematics,
physics and chemistry. Of significance here is that the
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European research in the field of natural science is real and
concrete but in that of social relations he feels that he has
to inculcate in the African only those ideas that serve the
interests of the European because they correspond to his ma¬
terial position and requirements. This is a condition that has
been developing more and more in favor of the settler (white
superiority and African inferiority, lack of civilization and
history and Christian standards, etc.) for centuries so that
any attempt by African nationalists to lead.(not drive) the
majority of their fellow-men must begin from the development
of those abstract ideas that unfold with the development of
concrete and real conditions. This necessarily means that the
majority itself should have been re-equipped with these intel¬
lectual instruments and weapons before they could be expected
to respond to stimuli requiring their full and willing parti¬
cipation in those movements that claim to lead them to national
liberation. ‘
A close analysis of the manifestos of the nationalist
8 6
movements in Rhodesia does not indicate any objective inclina¬
tion towards eliminating the foundation on which the conflict
between Blacks and Whites developed. On the contrary, as will
be seen later, these movements attempted to tie Africans more
and more to the very system that created these conditions.
What should have been the starting point for- any political
movement was the development of an ideology meant to elevate
8 6
N. Shamuyarira, op. cit., p. 190.
67
the masses to the point where they not only became conscious
of their real position in the capitalist system but where they
themselves began to be aware that they were definitely part
of the major combination of forces against white settler dom¬
inance. A discussion of the objectives of various nationalist
organizations in view of what has already been analyzed should
shed light on the rel.^tions between, leaders, the organizations
and the masses.
From what we have described as ANC objectives there is
evidence to the fact that ANC was not representative of the
needs of the African majority. First of all "equal opportunity
in every sphere; and the social, economic and political advance¬
ment of all" does not in any way reveal the economic and social
system that ANC envisages in the future. 'However the ANC comes
out in its true colors by stating that progress can only come
with an intergrated society under the "spirit of Partnership".
Partnership was essentially a creation of white society
meant to maintain white economic dominance, exploitation of
African labor and raw materials, the constant underdevelopment
of the rural areas and stagnation of the revolutionary con¬
sciousness of the masses. Under this economic system the only
progress that occurred was in the white community and the pro¬
ducts of African labor could not be purchased by the majority;
they did not need these products and did not have purchasing
power. The economic system was not geared towards developing
the whole society thus it left out the most important part of
the country, the rural areas. "Complete loyality to the Crown"
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obviously reflected the ANC's desire to remain tied to its
colonial masters and this desire reveals that the ANC Leaders
were willing to play an intermediary role thus underdeveloping
the country further into a neo-colonial situation. The leader
did not seem interested in removing the African from the exist
ing conditions where the majority labored for low wages paid
by most British companies to send raw materials to Britain and
other imperialist countries. They seemed to throw themselves
at the mercy of foreign companies who were willing to promote
and raise their salaries at the expense of the majority for
the price of 'stability' (stagnation of the revolutionary pro¬
cess) .
Only a little analysis would disclose, if African leaders
cared to do so, that the same British companies that were ex¬
ploiting African labor at very low wages were basically main¬
taining the same conditions in neighboring African states.
That intergration would solve "tribal and racial conflict"
seems to be an attempt by the nationalists to deny the fact
that tribalism has been raised to its current level of antag¬
onism by the economic and social conditions created by the
European himself. The poverty and filth of urban areas has
caused the African to direct his anger and frustration towards
another ethnic group, rather than the real enemy, the European
Most tribal conflicts have occurred in urban areas rathern
than rural ones but similar conditions (overcrowding and
poverty) cause anger and frustration in the rural areas to be
directed towards people living in other areas regardless of
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ethnic affiliations. A case in point is the frustration that
Whitehead imposed on the nationalist movements and pressure
from unemployment and low wages in the sixties. Instead of
most Africans in the cities directing their anger and frustra¬
tion at the government and its institutions they fought one
another under the pretext of political antagonism (ZAPU against
ZANU and vice versa). In Bulawayo this anger and frustration
was directed towards immigrant workers but not under the cat¬
egory of immigrant status but as supporters of ZANU (a rival
party to Nkomo's ZAPU). As a result:
...117,000 imigrant workers from Nyasaland from
unemployed Rhodesians who accused them of sup¬
porting ZANU a party that was formed by the group
that broke away from Nkomo.
It is obvious that the settlers benefited from these conditions
they created and that the nationalists, whether they realized
this or not, dance to the tune of "the settlers by indirectly
stimulating ethnic antagonism under the pretext of solving it.
The ANC's objectives, therefore, fell far short of the real
goals and needs of the masses even at the point of departure.
As the following statement shows, the ANC was willing to do no
more than shout the whites into submission.
I think the time has come when we should all realize
that the British idea is not to give a silent child
porrige before he cries. Until you make loud noises
the British people will not give you a single advance¬
ment. 8 8
^^New York Times, 27 September 1964, p. 11.
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Rhodesia Herald, 13 September 1957, p. 10.
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The NDP on the other hand seemed to be concerned with the
grievances of most Africans but one needs not be blinded by
its rhetoric. The NDP had taken upon itself the task of re¬
presenting African interests at the 1969 Constitutional con¬
ference but there is-no indication that they sought African
opinion on this issue before leaving for London. Most clearly
evident to the contrary is the point that what they had ini¬
tially agreed to as a fair constitution for Rhodesia could not
have brought about any economic changes for the majority of
Africans although certain social patterns could have developed
to the detriment of African liberation. The 1969 Constitution
would give fifteen seats out of sixty-five to ninety-five per¬
cent of the population and fifty seats to the remaining five
percent. The assertion that the majority of Africans could
not understand the "nuance of' phrases and meaning of legal
terms" seems to carry weight only if these proposals were im¬
posed on them, but if they analyzed these proposals from their
condition and their needs and aspirations as the basis for ac¬
cepting or rejecting them then this would necessitate associa¬
tion of these conditions and the changes that the new consti¬
tution proposed to make. The masses themselves would be in a
position to disclose that the new constitution would not solve
their basic problems, but merely include an insignificant
number of token Blacks who would retard the revolutionary pace.
What indicated that there existed a wide gap between African
leaders and the -masses is the fact that even after the execu¬
tive members had voiced their objection to the constitutional
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proposals, numerous debates occurred only among the leaders
and none of these issues were brought to the people for eval¬
uation, however, NDP did not possess such a machinery. What
NDP was concerned with most was the political games that the
rest of the politicians were playing. A case in point is that
pertaining to the strikes that occurrred in Gatooma where
workers set fire to buildings and QueQue where 1,700 miners
were striking for higher pay and food allowances. The condi¬
tions that led to these strikes are stated as follows:
It is believed that these strikes taking place almost
simutaneously at three widely seperate points in the
country are just the beginning of many more strikes
to come, for the basic minimum wage for urban Africans
has remained static for a long time ($18) during which
the cost of living has jumped.
Of significance to this issue is that the Plewman Commission
in 1957 had recommended $43.5 as the barest subsistence monthly
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wage for Africans. African teachers carried out their own
investigation and put. the amount at $60. Important as these
issues were to the workers, the NDP refused to represent the
workers' grievances because it was a political party and was
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not concerned with labor matters. This opinion does not
necessarilly reflect NDP's lack of concern with the interests
of the workers, but reveals its strong conviction that such
changes can come only with the NDP being in power. One can
not be convinced by this arguement,, especiaJLly when the NDP
seemed to be embracing the same political and economic system
8 9
Guardian, 9 September 1960, pp..3-6.
Ibid., p. 4.
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with the belief that the only change that was necessary was
to increase educational facilities, equal opportunity for all.
One Man One Vote, elimination of racism and tribalism and all
Acts that hindered African progress. What constantly emerges
from the policies of NDP is the African nationlist's belief
that by removing those conditions that served white interests
(only the syrfptoms ) poverty and non-useful production could
be solved. The increase of educational facilities would cer¬
tainly not remove economic and social problems from the African
community but would create a large number of privileged indi¬
viduals in addition to that already in existence.
What the NDP failed to realize was that there was, indeed,
no conflict between the British and settlers as long as the
settlers served British economic interests while perpetuating
their privileged lives. Essentially, what the settlers were
telling Britain was that there was no need for alarm because
the majority of Africans were not yet effectively organized to
demand power (in the words of the settler; not yet ready to
be intimidated by the few troublemakers and extremists). At
the same time Britain was warning the nationalist to be patient
with white attitudes just in case they force them into joining
the Union of South Africa. Britain was aware that since the
leaders would not be willing to lose the privileges they en¬
joyed under the current system of government they would be
less willing to push the Europeans too far and hopefully they
would accept the little that the settlers were willing to
offer in the 1961 Constitution. This plan almost worked when
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African nationalists initially accepted these proposals. That
Britain was not seriously attempting to give Africans power
is evident from R. A. Butler's statement that Britain would
not change the 1961 Constitution because even with fifteen
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seats Africans would gain independence in twelve years.
The formation of ZAPU, rolher, disclosed -the nationalists'
attempt to cause as much disturbance as possible in the hope
that Britain would react, then setting a stage for a more rad¬
ical approach to the problem. At the party conference that
would be held within two months, a deadline for Britain to act
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would be announced. In addition to this announcement, ZAPU
would drop constitutional methods if the country did not become
independent soon. To bring about this change:
We will only negotiate with Britain.
Britain put Southern Rhodesia into
this mess and Britain must get,it out.
ZAPU had followed the direction of its predecessors, that of
acting outside the influence Of the people. One could almost
conclude that the formation of ZAPU or any other African party
under the same leadership was an attempt to save the machinery,
property and positions that these movements had accumulated
and created. Its threats of violence if Britain did-not act
were running out of steam because the majority of riots and
demonstrations that were occurring were being brutally and ef-
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ficiently suppressed by the colonial army and police force.
Workers were striking for better working conditions and higher
wages but not for political reasons hence the constant harass¬
ment and intimidation of workers by ZAPU members. ZAPU had
not developed into a peoples' movement such that a radical ap¬
proach had been diffused among the masses. The fear of what
Shamuyarira calls a momentous step is exposed in his conversa¬
tion with Algerians at the United Nations:
You are wasting time. Fight the white settlers as
we did. Fight them until they are unable to stay...
Well then, you will have to kill 40,000 or so; and
another 30,000 will have to flee the country, be¬
fore the rest will let you govern them.
That is the serious truth, and Algeria is prepared
to help you...
We nodded, but said we could not take such a mo¬
mentous step without the permission of our party
officials at home...
We felt we had not yet exhausted all channels,
although no sign of hope was to be glimpsed then
from anywhere... least of all from Britian,95
The economic and social conditions were developing in such a
way that the stage was set for a neo-colonial situation. This
meant that most of those Africans who were aware of political
and economic inequalities (the educated and potentially pri¬
vileged) were seeking ways of eliminating these barriers. This
desire necessitated ,the utilization of what other Africans, in
Africa had successfully proved was capable of bringing about
the needed changes: the use of political parties for consti¬
tutional means. But this process did not mean that the will
of the masses had to be taken into consideration because to
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change the system in order to serve the needs of the masses
would require that the nationalist leaders sacrifice their own
desire for privileges. Unlike other African countries whose
leaders had succeeded in acquiring intermediary positions in
neo-colonial situations, Rhodesia had an intransigent settler
community whose repressive laws unintentionally inhibited
African nationalists from deceiving the majority into believing
that independence was the only solution to their economic pro¬
blems and the removal of settlers from power the only way to
end their poverty. This frustration and seeming lack of pro¬
gress towards independence is what caused discontentment among
various executive members of ZAPU. After examining the develop¬
ment of African rtationalist movements to this point one can
deduce that a break in the movement was inevitable taking into
consideration that it had run into a brick wall. However, there
are two possible approaches, judging from the conditions that
could have caused the split, that the new party or parties
could follow; the first would be a split into a more radical
wing with intentions to form a peoples movement (meaning an
attempt to work towards the transformatin of society) and the
second would be a split into groups similar to former movements
but with more radical rhetoric but no plans to lead the ma¬
jority towards national liberation. There is a prerequisite
for the split to take the first approach and this essentially
involves the attempt by the discontented executive to take the
issues to the people before any action is taken against the
older movement. This step not only enables the people to give
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counsel to the new party but also sets the stage from which
the new party may function, with the people's needs and parti¬
cipation as its driving force. If the movement that developed
from the split in ZAPU was the people and the people this move¬
ment then the people themselves would have decided, not between
Nkomo and Sithole or between ZAPU and ZANU, but between what
had failed and what seemed to be a genuine movement that people
felt themselves part of and saw as the determining force.
The reasons ZANU gave for the split and its objects do not
confirm their claim that they were embarked on a different
course from ZAPU or that they represented the interests and as¬
pirations of the majority. The charge that Nkomo had almost
deceived the people by initially accepting the 1961 Constitu¬
tion is legitimate because the constitution was not designed
to enhance the liberation of Africans. But, that Nkomo's ac¬
tion could have prompted the formation of ZANU with Sithole as
its President and Chitepo as its National Chairman controverts
this reasoning on the event that Sithole and Chitepo were co-
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drafsmen on certain sections of the Hirsch Proposals. That
Nkomo had vacilated in the 1950's and part o^f the early 1960's
is also true of the ZANU executive, especially Sithole, Takawira
and Shamuyarira and Edison Sithole 'who had flirted with inter¬
racial associations earlier in' thair political lives. The
other charge that Nkomo had lost support or rather that most
African Heads of State had lost confidence in Nkomo's leader-
96 .
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ship seems immaterial owing to the fact that the Organization
of African Unity's Liberation Support Committee allocated
funds and other essentials to both ZAPU and ZANU on an equal
basis. Shamuyarira's assertion that Nkomo eased his way into
a close relationship with Nasser by denouncing Israel's pol¬
icies should not blind him to the fact that one constantly
seeks compatible allies; and that Egypt was chosen rather than
Israel should, hopefully, be a reflection of Israel's Zionist
and imperialist policies.
Sithole did not take his charges to the masses of Rhodesia
before making decisions for them on who should be their leader:
Sithole delayed his return to Rhodesia for three
weeks, believing that the most important thing
was to get financial and Pan-African backing for
his group. He knew that he would be arrested soon
after returning to Rhodesia, on some charge or
Other, and he wanted to ensure there would be funds
available for transport for party organizers to get
into rural areas.97
Events in the country at this time show that the government had
taken further harsh steps to control the urban and rural areas.
The regime had banned all forms of meetings and had stationed
army and police officers in various sections of the country.
Thus whatever funds Sithole was seeking 'for transport for
party organizers to get into rural areas' would certainly not
be used for this purpose since the government had impounded all
other nationalist property and would do the same with ZANU.
Among the objects of ZANU was the nationalization of land
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and the administration of certain industries by a government
formed by Sithole. Yet, Sithole emphasizes that mining and
various secondary industries would not be nationalized due to
their being the economic mainstay of the Rhodesian economy and
also because these belong to private enterprise hence no govern
ment would want to be bothered with this task. They did not
add, however, that private enterprise was the backbone of pro-
9 8
fit making, the driving force behind the capitalist system,
whose functioning depended on African forced labor and low
wages, poor working conditions, land shortage and the constant
under-development of the African continent. They also failed
to add that Britain and other imperialist countries were the
beneficiaries of .most of private enterprise's embarkments.
This is the condition that Whitehead was trying to create
through the 1961 Constitution but the only difference was,
Africans would have retained their priviledged lives but not
political power; whereas the masses would be left out of both
situations: the one Whitehead envisaged and the new one Sit¬
hole was trying to create. That there were clashes between
ZAPU and ZANU is only indicative of the mood among their fol¬
lowers and not the majority of Africans. From the chronolog¬
ical chart of events in Rhodesia, there is evidence to support
the assertion that most of these clashes occurred in the cities
and not in the rural areas where the majority of Africans re¬sided.* Since the split originally occurred outside Rhodesia,
^^Ibid., p. 188.
*See Appendix at back of this study..
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the leaders took their dispute back to the people but managed
only to convince those in the urban areas closely associated
with them. Not even most of the African workers were affected,
judging by the number of times both Sithole and Nkomo unsuc¬
cessfully called on them to bring the Rhodesian economy down
through strikes. The clashes were at the level of leadership
and rank and file which indicates that they began to believe
that they were the movement, forgetting that the basis for this
antagonism could only be alleviated by the majority whom they
not only claimed to represent but was also still deep in the
heat of the conflict between Blacks and Whites.
The cause of the gap between African nationalist parties
and the masses, besides the government and its restrictive and
repressive laws, was the structure of the nationalist parties
themselves and their objectives (which have been described
already in this study). The parties' offices rather than ex¬
pressing a strong link between bottom and the top-most man
only cultivated links from the top-most to the immediate fol¬
lowers, with the link getting weaker and weaker at the very
bottom and virtually no links at all with the rural areas.
The top leaders appeared periodically to give lengthy speeches.
Few of the party organs that existed, exemplified by ZAPU's
Spear, were written in English; the language of the dominant
class, without regards to the desires of the majority of the
workers and peasants who could neither read nor write English.
The African Daily News, a paper widely circulated in the African
community, was written in English and owned by a British citizen
who spent most of his time outside Rhodesia. All radio and
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television stations were owned by the government and most of
the information broadcast for African consumption was either
meant to lull them or to criticize African nationalist parties
and aspirations. Most news and information coming from other
countries was censored and most radio broadcasts jammed. The
only possibility of receiving news about political activities
and world events for the majority in the rural areas was through
relatives and other individuals traveling to and from the city.
Ignoring the little information that trickled from the city
into rural areas, one may conclude that there was very little
communication between the leaders and the people on urgent mat¬
ters. Since there was no direct link between the masses and
the leaders, the reaction of the masses to news about the na¬
tionalist government was more of a mysterious feeling than a
concrete understanding of events as they were and what the
leaders were capable of achieving. The inculcation of western
ideology and its emphasis on hierarchy (education, position,
privilege and wealth) had a very negative effect on the masses.
They treated teachers (considered very educated and well
equipped in European "wisdom") as celebrities and endowed na¬
tionalists with magical powers (Nkomo supposedly had a magical
walking stick and hat that enabled him to vanish whenever the
police came to arrest him). That most people revered Nkomo is
exemplified by caSes where it had become customary for his fol¬
lowers to remove their coats and lay them in his path so that
his shoes would not touch the ground. For those who did not
experience these events but only heard of them, the exaggera-
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tion that complemented them over-whelmed their imagination tc
the point where support for Nkomo was not based on the under¬
standing of his policies and objectives but this eminence.
One may begin to believe that Nkomo enjoyed this privileged
position taking into consideration the number of times he was
outside the country. He had exiled himself in Britain for
twenty months following the ban on ANC but judging from his
speeches on his return to Rhodesia there is rehson to believe
that Nkomo was in Britain building this Messianic image of a
man who would 'sweep down on the whiteman and lead his people
to freedom'. It had become customary for most leaders to bui
such an image; Nkrumah, Banda, Kenyatta, Senghor and Azikiwe
had proved this to be an effective way of gaining support frc
the masses. While in London, on his way to Rhodesia Nkomo ha
suggested that Whitehead resign and that the situation in the
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Congo should be a lesson to Whites. In Accra he had sug¬
gested that Britain suspend the 1969 Constitution and give tl
country independence "not in ten years time but now".^^*^ V7he
he arrived in Rhodesia he told his supporters that his task
after twenty months in exile was probably the toughest facinc
any African nationalist leader. Thus:
While I have been away Sir Edgar hae passed
some terrible laws. I don't know what was
in his mind. But now I'm back I demand that
all the Congress leaders still detained should
be freed...101
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The danger had arisen in African nationalism, which created
a situation where the party was the leader and the leader the
party so that it had become possible for the leader to act out¬




From the dynamics of events shown on the chart at the end
of this study one may be abl^ tQ.deduce that the rhythm on the
time continuum signals changes in the political and economic
conditions in Rhodesia and African and government response to
them. The 1920's and 1960's show the highest series of events
by both Africans and the government, but the 1930's and forties
show little action on the part of Africans. The other element
one is able to detect from the charts is the occurrence of
these events in terms of the space dimension; most of them oc¬
cur in the urban ar.p.as as opposed to the rural areas where
most of the African population lived. One may assume that
either the government refused to report incidents in the rural
areas or that they did not exist.
From the description of events in time and space dimension
and the statements of the leaders, a summary of the development
of African nationalism can be completed. After 1923 Rhodesia
obtained self-rule, hence most African political action was
directed at the advent of Responsible Government which brought
about negative legislation to the detriment of Africans. There¬
fore, Africans resisted forced employment of labor and forced
re-location in reserves where abased apathy began to be visible.
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At this time the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association (RBVA),
Rhodesia Native Association (RNA) and the Matabele Home So¬
ciety claimed to represent African interests, however, their
aims and methods were not geared towards the emancipation of
the majority since they believed that gradual recognition of
the African's ability by the settler minority would bring about
changes in the African's favor. The ICU which had developed
as a response to the strikes at Shamva mine in 1927 used the
poor working conditions of Africans as its motive. Again the
ICU failed to change the conditions of the majority of Africans
because it did not attempt to stimulate some worker conscious¬
ness among Africans such that the workers could organize them¬
selves into a powerful force that could demand changes through
strikes and other means.
The period of the 1930's shows very little political ac¬
tion by Africans but some significant legislation by the set¬
tler government. ’ The Acts that were passed tas the study has
shown above) were meant to reserve vast African lands for
European settlement, to eliminate competition among Black and
White farmers, and Black and White workers and consequently
add to the deteriorating conditions in African rural and urban
areas. The effects of this legislation were not felt by
Africans until after the Second World War when a large number
of Europeans immigjrated to Rhodesia in response to the settler
government's drive to entice Europeans aboard to the 'favorable
conditions and high standard of living' for whites in the coun¬
try. After 1946, Africans were forced into barren and dry
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veals the artificiality of African nationalists', aims when it
came to the rural areas; mentioning the deteriorating conditions
in African reserves only as a means of obtaining mass support
but seeking solutions only to their immediate problems of pri¬
vilege. They neglected the main force behind which (if well
organized and educated) lay the power not only of their threat
to use African violence to disrupt the economy but of destroying
settler domination and the elimination of African exploitation.
Neglect of the masses necessarily meant the rejection of the
need and importance of ideology not only to elevate the con¬
sciousness of the.masses to a point where the.masses felt as
part of the solution but also to counter-act the ideology of
the dominant classes which had infilitrated almost every as¬
pect of the Africans way of life. What seemed to be forgotten
by the leaders was the fact that negation of African history
was not merely in the form of settler rule, oppressive laws
and economic exploitation but also the attempt through govern¬
ment, religious and educational institutions to destroy African
culture and whatever was the driving force behind the African's
way of life before the advent of settler colonialism. To use
the conditions of the majority to formulate ideology strong
enough to counter-act that of the dominant classes would con¬
stitute being aware that:
The cultural combat against'colonial domination
the first phase of the liberation movement—can be
planned efficiently only on the basis of the culture
of the rural and urban working masses, including the
nationalist (revolutionary) petty-bourgoisie who
have been re-Africanized or who are really for cul-
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African reserves and African workers and all Africans in gen¬
eral were affected by some form of discrimination or other.
The formation of the CYL and its merger into the African Na¬
tional Congress (ANC) in the 1950's reveals some form of re¬
action to the .effects of government legislation in the 1930's.
Liberal European stimulation and outside African influence gave
those educated and high level employed Africans who had been
affected by white domination tools for attempting to change
these conditions, if not for the whole population then for
themselves. Africa,n nationalist parties at this time used na¬
tional ills as the driving force behind their campaign for
political and economic advancement. One might view this event
of African nationalist action as the desire to accelerate those
conditions that determined the pace for bringing the 'spirit
of partnership' to fruition; which had been initiated by the
formation of the Central African Federation. The aims of this
particular action by African nationalists are clearly revealed
in the chart where even though the rural areas accomodate the
majority of Africans and indicate the region where there is
most exploitation, poverty, disease and hunger, constitute the
least political action. That there was very little political
action in the most populous and most exploited region of the
country stems from two factors, the first being that the set¬
tler government established very strict and repressive admin¬
istrations in these areas for this very purpose, and the second
being that African nationalists neglected full participation
by rural masses in their political programs. This point re-
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tural re-conversion. Whatever may be the com¬
plexity of this basic cultural panorama, the
liberation movement must be capable of distin¬
guishing within it the essential from the secondary,
the positive from the negative, the progressive from
the reactionary in order to characterize the master ^^2
line which defines progressively a national culture.
For the deteriorating conditions to be brought back to an ef¬
fective production level again, the masses need to be aided in
snapping out of this’apathy into' a new consciousness and real¬
ization .
Not all of the African nationalist leaders (including all
those who were trusted by the people) were conscious of the
mass movement being the formidable force that threatened white
power. This realization necessarily meant that the leaders
were also willing to sacrifice their privileges. The top lead¬
ership of ANC, NDP, ZAPU, and ZANU had not only received west¬
ern forms of education"but had also experienced a privileged
life at one time or another and the party manifestos reveal
that they were fighting within the boundaries (the only way
they knew how having obtained limited tools through a confined
educational system) of the dominant ideology. Hence they were
frustrated at every point of desired accomplishment, after all
those who were frustrating them were experts at their own tools,
which the nationalists were only attempting to mimic. Of sig¬
nificance to this thought is that any attempt to develop a mass
movement for social transformation would necessarily eliminate
the intermediary position that the leaders were willing to play
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hence the minimal effort to educate the masses. The few trips
that were made to the countryside to seek African support
through lengthy speeches was a lack of will to understand that:
To educate the masses politically doe-s not mean,
cannot mean, making a political speech. What it
means is to try relentlessly and passionately to
teach the masses that everything depends on them;
that if we stagnate it is their responsibility and
that if we. go forward it is due to them too; that
there is no famous man Who will take the responsi¬
bility for every thing, but that the demiurage is
the people themselves and the magic hand are finally
only the hands of the people.
The history of African nationalism is a history of frustration
and neglect of the African masses by both the government and
those who claimed to represent African interests. From the ob¬
jectives of most African nationalist parties one could conclude
that the neglect of the masses and the.intransigence of the set¬
tlers would be the continuing demise of African nationalist
parties and hopefully the frustration of some of those people
who do not have the masses at heart.
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1922 *Referendum. White vote of 8,774 to 5,089 in favor
self-government
1923 *Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing British
colony with approximately 34,000 settlers
1923 Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association formed as a non¬
political party
1924 Martha Ngano became secretary, and Maxiyani acting
President of RBVA
1924 Rhodesia Native Assocation sent proposals on how
government could assist Africans to Rhodesian
authorities
1925 RNA asks Coghlan for government favors because it
claims not to be as militant as the RBVA1925*Charles Coghlan denounced Martha Ngano as a polit-
tical agitator and proceeded to repress organized
Black protest
1927 Miners went on a strike at Shamva mine and this
event caused fear of Bolshevism among whites
1927 *Governor and Commandant of the Defence Force ordered
his men to stop the strike at Shamva
1928 ICU formed and calls on unity between Black and White
workers
1929 Mphanda blamed Indians for the economic exploitation
of Africans
1929 *Government threatens to deport Mphanda but he exits
before this happens
1930 *The Land Apportionment Act was passed. It established
basis of European economic control in Southern Rhodesia
forty-eight percent land allocated to Africans; fifty-
two percent to Europeans





















*Maize Control Act was passed; to discourage African
sales
*Industrial Conciliation Act was passed and explicitly
excluded Africans workers from its definition of em¬
ployee
Bantu Congress was formed
*Native Registration Act was passed to tighten up
the Pass Law
*The Tabacco Marketing Act was passed to limit compe¬
tition among growers (especially Africans)
* Industrial Conciliation Act amended to allow white
workers to control Black workers
Bantu Benefit Transport Society played leading role
in organizing the strike of 1946 '
The Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
was formed
*The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed
The City Youth League was formed in Salisbury
Militant African National Congress was formed as a
merger of two parties; CYL and ANC
ANC approved resolution calling on all Africans to re¬
frain from supporting UFP after Todd's ouster
*Governmerit declared State of Emergency and detained
a large number of Africans. Opposition leaders S.
Aitken-Cade support government move
African women (300 of them) boycott stores belonging
to Africans who did not support ANC
*Government enacts severe repressive laws to combat
African nationalism. Police are given power to ar¬
rest and seize African property without warrants
*Police seize office equipment and documents belonging
to NDP
♦Police raid NDP offices in. five Rhodesian cities and
arrest Mawema, Samkange and Takawira
Africans (20,000 of them) march towards the center of
Salisbury but are dispersed by Federal troops
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1960 One hundred fifty Africans and two nationalists
leaders arrested for demonstrations
1960 *Government said that it would enlarge defense force
and give it anrored cars and' high velocity rifles
1960 *Police and federal troops kill three Africans during
riots
1960 Sixty five thousand African workers stayed away from
work after they were intimidated and persuaded by mobs
1960 *Sir Roy Welensky issues a statement in Pretoria
that white para-troopers will be trained in South
Africa to deal with any racial uprising
1960 *Robert Tredgold, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Central African Federation resigned cites
the Law and Order Maintenance Act as the reason for
his action
1960 Nkomo was elected President of NDP
1960 Gas bombs were thrown into houses belonging to
African UFP members
1961 *(February) Sir Roy maintains that communism was behind
African nationalism and the Federal troops would crush
any insurrection
1961 (March) Riots broke out in Bulawayo after NDP meeting
1961 *(April) Capital flight from Federation during the
riots put at $70,000,000
1961 (May) Nkala was arrested for breaking or violating
Law and Order Maintenance Act
1961 *(May) Police used snarling dogs to prevent Africans
from welcoming Nkomo at Salisbury airport
1961 (June) M. Mawema and P. Matimba were kicked and
punched by NDP supprters for proposing to form new
militant party
1961 (June) Africans organize sit-ins in hotels, restau¬
rants, stores and elevators. Various women arrested
for this action,
1961 (June) Kaunda and Nkomo declare unity in fighting




















(July) Nkomo plans nation-wide demonstration against
white referendum
(July) Defense Minister of the Federation calls on
more police reservists to counter-act Nkomo's action
(July) Two Africans were killed during ripts against
constitutional referendum
*(July) Whites approve 1969 Constitution by ratio of
2:1
(July) Africans reject order by NkomP to stay away
from work■
*(July) Government banned all strikes
(August) Two thousand Africans in Municipality went
on strike for more wages and demanded that the wage
system should be changed
(August) Nkomo went to London with the results of his
referendum
Resistance campaign against white government planned
by Nkomo. NDP leaders planned 24 hour fast as first
part of first stage of political action
(October) Chiefs Kaisa, Mzimini and Sigola blamed NDP
for causing rural disturbances
*(December) Whitehead banned NDP and Nkomo called him
a dictator while in Dar es Salaam
*(December) Federal government sent troops to Rhodesia
to combat wide-spread 'intimidation by African extre¬
mists blamed for arson and other damage in rural areas
(December) Nkomo formed ZAPU and stated that it would
not support new constitution or contest election
*(January) Sir Hugh Foot rejects U. N. offer to send
observers to Rhodesia
(February) Parirenyatwa became vice-deputy of ZAPU
(April) ZAPU members stoned Zimbabwe National Party
members and police used tear-gas to disperse the
crowd
(April) Nkomo tells Africans to punch Britain hard,
he was in New York
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1962 *(May) White troops with bayonets patrolled streets
after African workers went on strike and clashed
with police
1962 *(May) Butler told Europeans that Britain would not
let them down
1962 *(May) Government bars ZAPU leaders from attending
Pan-African conference in Accra
1962 *(July) Whitehead introduces legislation that would
revoke civil rights of persons convicted of political
intimidation to preserve internal security
1962 (August) After the arrest of Terry Maluleke the secre¬
tary general of African TUC in Sinoa Africans rioted
and demolished beer-hall, police used tear-gas to
break-up crowd
1962 *(August) Parliament gave initial approval to broad
new legislation that would outlaw African nationalist
campaigns in Southern Rhodesia; amendments to Unlawful
Organization Act and Law and Order Maintenance Act
1962 *(September) Police raid offices of ZAPU General
Secretary Mugabe while Nkqmo was at Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' Conference
1962 (September) Three gasoline bombs were thrown into
white houses in Salisbury and one in center of Indus¬
trial Bulawayo
1962 (September) Two white cars were stoned and a church
burnt down in Mazoe
1962 *(September) Whitehead banned ZAPU and rounded-up most
ZAPU leaders that were in the country at the time
1962 (September) Nkomo formed government in exile, with
Sithole at the Director in Tanganyika
1962 * (Septembei:) Whitehead sought help from chiefs to fill
vaccuum left by nationalist party
1962 (September) Nkomo flew to Tanganyida and other African
leaders questioned this move
1962 (September) Mugabe stated that Africans would have to
go underground and that there could never be Law and
Order as long as Africans were detained
1962 (October) Riots broke out in Salisbury and Bulawayo
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1962 *Whitehead lost elections and Rhodesian Front, a
white right-wing party won
1963 *(February) New right-wing government introduced new
legislation for compulsory death penalty on certain
actions of arson and sabotage. Punishment for carry
ing offensive weapons increased to 20 years imprison
ment and lashes
1963 *(March) Butler conferred, with Winston Field on
Rhodesian situation
1963 (April) Nkomo was sentenced to six months hard labor
for smashing a cop
1963 *(April) Whites demanded independence and Britain
stated that there were no real legal or constitu¬
tional ground on which independence could long be
with-held from the colony
1963 *(May) Government suggested that arms were coming in
from Katanga for use by Africans
1963 *(May) Government claimed that three, automatic
rifles, two revolvers and 755 rounds.of ammunition
were found in Nkomo's care
1963 (May) Sithole predicted a violent and bitter bloody
struggle if Whites declared independence
1963 *(May) Field went to London to seek independence
1963 (July) Patrick Matimba and Eddyson Sambo were ar¬
rested for subversive statements
1963 (July) Nkomo was ousted from ZAPU for inconsiderate,
unconstitutional, blunderous, irresponsible and un¬
democratic actions (so said those who ousted him)
1963 (July) Sithole and the' other leaders of the split
were suspended from ZAPU by Nkomo
1963 *(July) Government arrest Sithole at Salisbury air¬
port after a year of self-imposed exile for distri¬
buting subversive documents
1963 (August) Sithole formed ZANU with H. Chitepo as its
National Chairman and L. Takawira as Deputy Leader
1963 (August) Four thousand members of ZAPU denounced Sit
hole and his new party
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1963 (August) Africans punched and kicked three policeman
at a meeting addressed by Nkomo
1963 (August) An African father and child were severly
hurt by a bomb that was thrown into their house
1963 (September) Nkomo formed PCC
1963 *(September) Riot police dispersed an African crowd
of 1,000 who attempted to break a meeting addressed
by Sithole
1963 (November) Dupont accuses African' nationalism of being
a barbaric force that has swept many African countries
into anarchy and poverty
1963 (December) Nkomo was sentence to nine months jail for
calling Rhodesian government Nazist and Fascist
1963 (December) Bulawayo has fifth bomb blast in one week
and police claim to have found foreign manufactured
anti-personnel grenades
1963 *End of Central African Federation. Rhodesia's armed
forces, previously under Brtish control and command,
handed over to the settler government
1964 (January) Two Africans were shot dead in Salisbury
after an incident of stoning and disturbances. Police
had to protect African workers who had defied call
to strike as a solidarity gesture to coincide with
Nkomo's trial in Umtali
1964 *(February) Police arrested hundreds of Africans in a
surprise raid and later detained them
1964 (March) Leopold Takawira was arrested for subversive
language
1964 (March) Britain was asked by the U. N. to intervene
in the case of Richard Mapolisa and other nationalists
who had been sentenced to death
1964 *(March) British P. M. Home told Africans to be patient
with whites in case they are driven into a last ditch
stand in alliance with South Africa
1964 (March) Nkrumah invites Nkomo and Sithole for consult¬
ations, both accept
1964 *(April) Field resigns due to pressure from right-wing
group in within R. F. Smith became Prime Minister
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1964 (April) Dupont acquired powers to cane, arrest, de¬
tain, impose death penalty and declare State of Emer¬
gency to ' liquidate opposition
1964 (April) Nkomo and Msika were sent to Gonakudzingwa
for detention
1964 (April) Two hundred sixty-five Africans were arrested
after youths kicked and punched white women at OKs in
Salisbury
1964 (April) Fighting broke out between ZANU and ZAPU
1964 (April) Two Africans were shot dead after they burnt
buses, beer-halls and stores and attempted to stop
other Africans from going to work
1964 (July) Africans killed one police reservist during
a fight between ZANU and ZAPU supporters
1964 (July) Sithole was put in custody for alleged violation
of one law or another
1964 (August) O.A.U. Liberation Support Committee decided
to aid both ZANU and ZAPU after failing to unite them
1964 (August) Twenty more PCC manbers were sent to Gona¬
kudzingwa
1964 (August) ZANU mobilized forces against PCC after the
other did.the same and fighting between the two brpke-
out .
1964 *(August) High Fields put under a State of Emergency
and territorial troops were sent in to screen all
Africans..
1964 *(August) Smith threatens to declare independence
1964 (August) The African Daily News was banned after
parliament voted 24:18 to do so
1964 *(September) Rhodesian government raised voting qualifi¬
cations by ten per cent
1964 *(November) Whites vote for independence and agree by
90 percent and Smith uses chiefs as represenatives
of African opinion
1964 (November) Nkomo's restriction increased to four years
but he said he did not believe that white government
would last four years
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1964 *(December) Rhodesian parliament approved death penalty
law for the possession of bomb, with a sentence of
20 years imprisonment for any offensive weapon
1965 *(February) Commonwealth Secretary, Bottomley arrived
in Rhodesia to 'get a cross-section of opinion within
the country'
1965 *(May) Rhodesia Front won general election
1965 *(November) Rhodesia declared a State of Emergency
1965 *(November) Rhodesia declared UDI
1965 ZANU announced the formation of a peoples government
inside Rhodesia with its HQ at Sikhombela where its
leaders were restricted
Most of the information on these events were prepared
from a comparison of dates and events in three newspapers,
the New York Times, the Guardian (British) and the VJashington
Post. Some of the events and dates were taken from Nkrumah's
book The Rhodesia File, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
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APPENDIX A
The European and African Labor Force
by Industrial Groups, 1926-51
Europeans
inaustry 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1931
Agriculture and forestry 4,172 4,009 3,037 4,047 7,129
Mining and quarrying 2,034 1,796 3,676 3,124 2,b35 2,706
Manufacturing, construction.
water ana electricity ser-
vices 2,437 3,639 3,7b4 3,493 7,754 16,315
Transport and coroiaunications. . 2,000 2,79^ 2,37b 2,270 2,972 5,325
commerce 2,902 3,b9d 4,435 5,103 5,bd3 11,322
services 3,712 3,72b 5,040 7,23b 9,093 15,030
Not adequately described db9 260 237 219 241 537
Total. 17,449 22,283 24,357 27,302 33,245 60,494
Africans
Agriculture and forestry 72,70b 67,661 ^3,270 102,510 150,069 212,652
Mining and quarrying 41,33b 38;4b3 04,337 83,3b1 70,09b 63,005
Manufacturing, construction.
water and electricity ser-
vices 8,628^' 8,2591^ 25,033 3b,309 53,631 109,363
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Transport and communications.. 7,436"*' 17,174® 9,406 10,350 13,293 17,613
Domestic service
other (including government
and other services and com-
24,917 2>,310 32,200 39,760 45,230 00,657
merce) • 25,005 6,974 20,249 26,606 44,529 59,513
Total 173,596 I63,6b1§ 254,297 303,279 376,606 ' 530,203
* "Factory, building, and allied trades.' ^ Railways only. ^ 'pactory or worKsdop'
§ T^e only publication of thr results of the 1931 was in the cifficial yearbook, of
southern Rhodesia, 193^; the figure given for 'Transport and communications' appears to in¬
clude employment otherwise classified in 1926 and I93b. The figure shown under 'other' is
only for 'snops, store, or office' and the total figure may be incomplete, in spite of the
depression of that year.

























Total .... 3,433,960 70.8
Ndehele and Nguni speakers ., 15.8





Thonga-Hlengwe .... 2,500 0.1
Other . 13,920 0.3
Total .... 236,240 4.9












Speakers of xang,uafees not identi¬
fiable or not stated 37,050 0.7
Grand Total 4,546,930 100.0
^persons identified themselves as speaKing sb.ona rather
than one of the s^ona dialects.
source. Adapted from Rhodesia, coiitral statistical office,
1969 population cotisus interiia Report, 11. Tt^e
African population, Salisbury, ApriT“1969, p.' "27.
